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ABSTRACT 
Background: Generic drugs provide a safe, effective and affordable alternative to 
medicines whose patent protection has expired. The affordability of generics improves 
access to medicines and thus improves health outcomes. The generic pharmaceutical 
industry is complex; profitability depends on the number of other generics on the market.  
Objective: To develop a model that explains structural relationships in the off-patent 
market between the price of a generic drug and the characteristics of a drug, formulation 
market and regulatory processes in the South African pharmaceutical industry. 
Sources of Data: Innovators’ drugs and their generic equivalents were selected from all 
the molecules whose patents expired between 1999 and 2012. Data were obtained from 
IMS Health (Total Private Market Report) and National Department of Health (Database 
of Medicine Prices) for the patents’ expiration dates, prices, sales, launch dates of 
generics, therapeutic groups, schedules, and dosage forms of drugs in the sample.  
Principal Findings: Generic entry into the local pharmaceutical industry is low, slow and 
selective. The developed model for this study identified seven market variables that were 
found to have an influence on the prices of generic drugs in South Africa. The 
determinants of generic entry are the market size of the on-patent innovator product, and 
the complexity of manufacture of a dosage form. The introduction of the transparent 
pricing system has had a significant impact in reducing the average unit prices of generics 
in South Africa. However, there appears to be policy incoherencies between the public 
health and industrial policies of the South African government as it pertains to 
pharmaceuticals. The erosion of the manufacturing capacity in South Africa could 
potentially be attributed to the pharmaceutical pricing policy. The overreliance on 
pharmaceutical imports for satisfying local consumption poses a risk to the security of 
supply of medicines in a country that has a high burden of diseases.  
Conclusion: The introduction of legislative reforms related to the pricing of medicines in 
South Africa has largely yielded positive results in making medicines to be more 
accessible. Policy-making requires monitoring and evaluation programmes and inclusivity 
across all the stake-holders.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A favourable environment for generic medicines is likely to aid governments in sustaining 
the provision of healthcare and control of pharmaceutical expenditures. Generic 
medicines have the same quality, safety profiles and therapeutic efficacy as originator 
medicines, but are less expensive than originator medicines. This chapter highlights the 
problems of inequitable access to healthcare, particularly medicines, in South Africa.  
 
The chapter is broadly divided into 5 sections with Section 1.1 briefly providing the basis 
for regulation of the prices of medicines in South Africa. This section provides a context 
for the research study as well as highlights gaps in the field that the study seeks to 
address. It is noteworthy that Section 1.1 is not a literature review section. Literature 
review is conducted at relevant parts throughout the thesis such as under Sections 3.6 
(e.g. MCC’s registration timelines and authorized generics), 4.4, 5.4 & 6.1 - 6.5. Section 
1.2 presents the purpose of the study covering the research problem, question, 
hypothesis, research goals, and objectives. Sections 1.3 – 1.5 deal with the significance 
of the study, limitations and the overview of the thesis respectively. This is followed by 
the chapter conclusion in Section 1.6.  
 
1.1. Introduction and Background 
A review of the literature into studies that sought to understand the factors that influence 
the pricing of generic drugs is preceded by a brief appraisal of the healthcare system in 
South Africa as well as an outline of the legislative framework for pricing generic drugs in 
South Africa.  
1.1.1. Introduction to the Healthcare System in South Africa 
To put the pharmaceutical pricing policy of South Africa into perspective, it is important to 
provide a brief background into the structure of the healthcare system in South Africa. 
The country consists of two sectors of healthcare, the public and the private sectors. 
The public sector is an under-resourced three-tier system (local, provincial and national 
government) that serves more than 85% of the South African population.1-2 It provides the 
primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare organized into district, regional and tertiary 
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levels.3 This sector is financed by a combination of national taxes as well as revenue 
contributions from local government and user fees.2  
The public sector operates an Essential Drug List (EDL) programme, a criterion for 
inclusion of a medicine in the EDL is that a drug must be of high quality, cost-effective 
and meet the healthcare needs of the majority of the country’s citizens.3 It was estimated 
in 2015 that the public sector was supplied with approximately 2400 product lines by about 
90 manufacturers and importers at an estimated value of $1 billion.1 The public sector 
employs the use of competitive bidding, tenders system, for the procurement of its 
medicines and other supplies under the auspices of the Central Procurement Unit of the 
Department of Health.1   
 
On the opposite end of the healthcare spectrum in South Africa is the well-resourced 
private healthcare sector that serves approximately 15% of the South African population.1 
According to Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS), the private pharmaceutical market 
in South Africa was valued at $4.1 billion in 2014.1 There is a broad portfolio of medicines 
that are available in the private health sector that amount to approximately 5000 product 
lines by about 130 manufacturers and importers.1  
 
Private healthcare in South Africa is primarily financed through medical aid schemes and 
to a less extent by out-of-pocket payments.2 The pricing of medicines in the private sector 
was previously left to market forces.1 As such, pharmaceutical companies engaged in a 
wide range of pervasive practices such as offering volumes-linked discounts and rebates 
to wholesalers as well as offering bonuses and samples to healthcare providers with a 
view to coerce them to using their products.1 The prices of medicines in South Africa were 
found to be high by international standards which was attributable to the wide range of 
pervasive practices that were employed by pharmaceutical companies.1-2   
1.1.2. Brief Introduction to the Pharmaceutical Industry in South Africa 
Business Monitor International (BMI) Ltd, a Fitch Group Company, reported that the South 
African pharmaceutical industry was valued at ZAR 43.41Billion (USD 3.4 Billion) in 2015 
which was 1.09% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).4 The industry is regulated by 
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the Medicines and Related Substances Act, Act No. 101 of 1965 (as amended) under the 
auspices of the Medicines Control Council (MCC).1  
 
The pharmaceutical landscape in South Africa comprise of the prescription and over-the-
counter (OTC) pharmaceutical products supplied by both generic drug companies and 
research-based drug companies.4 
 
Majority of leading pharmaceutical multinational companies have presence in South 
Africa, these companies predominantly market branded innovative drugs.4 The local 
pharmaceutical industry is relatively advanced albeit its focus on the manufacture of 
generic drugs. Two dominant local manufacturers are Aspen Pharmacare and Adcock 
Ingram, both companies are generic manufacturers.4  
1.1.3. Legislative Framework for the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals in South Africa 
The advent of democracy in 1994 was amidst major health and social challenges in South 
Africa. In 1994, major disparities and inequalities in income, health status and access to 
health and other social services existed in South Africa. This was the result of previous 
apartheid policies that ensured racial, gender and provincial disparities. To redress this 
legacy of apartheid, the democratically elected South African government prioritized 
equity in its health policy goals.3  
 
In recognition of these challenges, a new constitution was enacted in 1996; Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa (No. 108 of 1996).7 Section 27(1) of the constitution of 
South Africa declares that access to adequate healthcare (including medicines) is a 
human right. Furthermore, Section 27(2) of the constitution declares that the state is duty 
bound to ensure that there are sound regulations and laws that promote affordability and 
thus improve access to healthcare (including drugs).7 Against this background, a White 
Paper on the Transformation of the Health System in South Africa was introduced in 
1997.3 A key policy objective of the White Paper was the promotion of equity, accessibility 
and health services. Provision of pharmaceutical care was dealt with extensively in a 
document called the National Drug Policy (NDP) that formed part of the addendums of 
the White Paper. The NDP is a blueprint that provides a policy framework on medicines 
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in South Africa.5 As reported in the NDP, the government conducted a situational analysis 
of the pharmaceutical landscape following the advent of a democratic dispensation. The 
government found, inter alia, that the prices of medicines in South Africa were high by 
international standards.  
 
Given the central role that pharmaceuticals play in the delivery of healthcare, the problem 
of high prices of medicines received immediate attention of the new government. This 
resulted in a wide range of legislative reforms aimed at ensuring equity and promotion of 
access to healthcare particularly pharmaceuticals across the nation. Cornerstone to the 
existing statutes that were targeted for reforms was the Medicines and Related Substance 
Act (No. 101 of 1965), henceforth Medicines Act. The first amendments to the Medicines 
Act were proclaimed in 1997 and in 2003 the Patents Act was also amended.6 Except for 
the Medical Schemes Act (No. 131 of 1998), all other new statutes that were promulgated 
had broader societal benefits that transcended healthcare; notably the Competition Act 
(No. 89 of 1998).8 
 
 Table 1.1 below provides an overview of the guiding policy framework that underpins the 
South African legislative interventions with a view to address the challenges of inequitable 
healthcare delivery, particularly pharmaceutical price regulation. The government 
employed a broad spectrum of price regulations comprising of indirect and direct price 
regulations.8 Indirect price regulations were introduced with a view to create and promote 
a competitive market that would result in an exertion of a downward pressure on the prices 
of medicines.8 These were done with a view to increase affordability and thus increase 
access to medicines.8  
 
As shown in Table 1.1, the Medicines Act was amended to introduce Section 15C to allow 
parallel importation of patented medicines. In cases where a local price for a patented 
essential medicine that is needed to respond to an emergency is higher than in other 
countries, the state is at liberty of applying this law to import such a drug into the country.  
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Other than parallel importation the South African legislative framework has made 
provision for an array of legal instruments that can be invoked to stimulate competition 
with a view to drive the prices down. For instance, compulsory licensing can be pursued 
under the Competition Act by proving to the courts that a position of dominance is being 
abused by a patentee to the detriment of society.8 
 
Table 1.1 Legislative Framework for the South African Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
Source: Hassim et al. 8 
 
In 2004, the Competition Act was used successfully in a landmark case that resulted in 
the issuing of compulsory licenses to local generic manufacturers to produce generic 
copies of antiretroviral (ARVs) drugs. The case was brought to the courts by civil society 
organizations in the case of Hazel Tau and Others vs GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer 
Section 27(1) Everyone has the right to have access to health care services (Bill of Rights)
Section 27(2)
The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of each of these rights (Bill of Rights)
Goals and  
Objectives To promote equity, accessibility and utilisation of health services
To extend the availability and ensure the appropriateness of the services
Health Objectives To ensure the availability and accessibility of essential drugs to all citizens
Economic 
Objectives
To lower the cost of drugs in both the private and public sectors (by developing specific strategies to increasing the 
use of generics in South Africa)
National Objectives To support the development of the local pharmaceutical industry and the local production of essential drugs
Section 15(2)(b) Provides for expeditious registration of medicines in the Essential Drug List within 9 months
Section 15C Made provisions for parallel importation of medicines that are still under patent to South Africa for public sector
Section 18A Forbids supply of medicines in terms of bonus, rebates and incentives schemes
Section 18B Forbids the sampling of medicines
Section 22A Control of medicines and scheduled substances
Section 22C 1(b)
Empowers the government, through the MCC, to prescribe the standard for manufacture of medicines in South Africa - 
PIC/S
Section 22F Makes it mandatory for the pharmacists to inform patients of generic equivalents of the prescribed drug
Section 22G Made a provision for the introduction of the transparent pricing system for medicines based on single exit price
Section 22G(2) Made provisions for regulation of dispensing fees and capping of logistics fees
Regulation 5(2)(e) Made provisions for benchmarking of pharmaceutical (innovator products) prices internationally
Regulation 14(5) Made provisions for use of pharmacoeconomic studies in support of price
Section 46(1) Stipulates a duration for which a patent remains in force as 20 years
Section 69(A) Provides for limitations to intellectual property by allowing registration of generics prior to patent expiry 
Regulation 8
Makes a provision for implementation of cost-containment strategies such as the use of formularies & reference price 
lists
Medicines and Related Substances Act (No. 101 of 1965 as Amended)
National Drug Policy of the Republic of South Africa
Patents Act (No. 57 of 1978)
Regulations in terms of the Medical Schemes Act (No. 131 of 1998)
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act (No. 108 of 1996)
White Paper on the Transformation of the Health System in South Africa 
Regulations Relating to a Transparent Pricing System for Medicines and Scheduled Substances, Medicines Act (No. 101 of 1965)
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Ingelheim. Compulsory licensing agreements are covered by law whereby the patent 
holder is entitled to receive a reasonable royalty, usually (2–10) %.8 
 
Further indirect price regulations were instituted by the South African government with a 
view to stimulate competition related to the introduction of Section 69(A) to the Patents 
Act, Act No. 57 of 1978 (as amended). The introduction of Section 69(A) makes a 
provision for a non-infringement of a valid pharmaceutical patent. This provision allows 
regulatory applications for generic drugs to be filed with the Medicines Control Council 
whilst the patent remains enforceable with a view to facilitate a timeous launch of generic 
drugs upon patent expiry thus improving access to medicines in line with Section 27(1) of 
the constitution.6-7  
 
The promulgation of the Competition Act in 1998 provided an instrument for the 
government to act against any anticompetitive behavior in the market.8 Such 
anticompetitive behavior can take a form of collusions by competitors to fix prices or 
agreeing to carve up the market into various segments or sectors. Collusions are aimed 
at keeping the competition at minimum in the market which is often to the detriment of 
society. 8 
 
On the other hand, the direct price control interventions act directly to regulate how prices 
are set. They are aimed at complementing the indirect price controls mechanisms where 
competition alone is not adequate to keep the prices of medicines down.8 The direct price 
control interventions can be classified into three groups, namely, government laws that 
prohibit high prices, direct price controls and state guidelines for price setting. The direct 
price regulations were introduced with a view to improve access to medicines by directly 
reducing the prices of medicines in South Africa.9 This category pertains to the rules or 
guidelines that are put in place by the state to assist stakeholders such as manufacturers 
to set their own prices. The value of this approach is that it makes it mandatory for 
stakeholders to justify their prices thus ensuring that there is accountability and 
transparency in how prices are set.9 Prior to the institution of the legislative reforms that 
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deals with the pricing of medicines, the manufacturers were at liberty to set their own 
prices and had no legal duty to account as to how such prices were calculated. 9 
 
To achieve the goal of ensuring that there is transparency and accountability in how prices 
are set, the Medicines Act was reformed by the introduction of Section 18A, 18B and 22G. 
The government banned the perverse commercial activities through the operation of 
Section 18A and 18B.4 Section 22G provided for the setting up of the pricing committee 
whose primary role is to advise the Minister of Health on transparent pricing system. 
Furthermore, Section 22G ensured that transparency and accountability were built into 
the system with the introduction of a concept of Single Exit Price (SEP).9 
  
The SEP is the price that is set by the manufacturer or importer of a medicine or 
scheduled substance, it includes the value-added tax (VAT) and the logistics fee.9Prior to 
its implementation, the pricing regulations stipulated the methodology that the 
manufacturers had to follow in setting the SEP for their products.9 On the commencement 
of these regulations, 02 June 2004, for any given medicine the SEP was required not to 
be set higher than the weighted average net selling price for the calendar year 2003.9 In 
accordance with these regulations, for any given dosage form of any medicine, each unit 
bears the same price irrespective of the pack size. Lastly, the upward adjustment of SEP 
is subject to a pre-determined percentage fee that is set by the Minister of Health upon 
obtaining advice from the pricing committee. The price increases that are determined by 
the minister set the ceiling without prescribing the floor for medicines’ prices.9  
 
The` Medical Scheme Act makes provisions for the schemes to adopt managed 
healthcare principles. In this way the utilization of various healthcare services is monitored 
using interventions that are aimed at monitoring the appropriateness, promoting efficacy, 
quality and cost-effectiveness of the delivery of relevant health services.10 Insofar as the 
pharmaceutical care is concerned, some of the prominent managed healthcare strategies 
that are used by medical aid schemes with a view to prohibit high prices of drugs are the 
use of formularies and reference pricing. The use of formularies is underpinned by generic 
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substitution in accordance with Section 22F of the Medicines Act. Mandatory generic 
substitution is an important instrument for reducing unnecessary drug expenditure.11  
Reference pricing is another prominent strategy of managed healthcare that is commonly 
employed with a view to prohibit high prices of medicines.12 Reference pricing consists of 
internal and external reference pricing. Internal reference pricing within the medical aid 
schemes context requires that drugs be classified into therapeutic classes with a 
reference drug being selected for any given class.13 A price ceiling is then set in line with 
the selected reference drug, the price ceiling represents the maximum reimbursable price 
with a patient having to pay a difference if a more expensive drug is used.13 This mainly 
encourages the use of generic drugs.13  
1.1.4. Patent Expiry, Generic Entry and Pricing of Generic Drugs 
The generic market consists of companies that are involved in the development, 
production, distribution, sales and marketing of usually cheaper multi-source 
pharmaceutical products that are interchangeable with the innovator product following an 
expiry of its patent protection or exclusivity rights.14 Generic manufacturers compete ‘on 
a knife edge’ of narrow margins of profitability, and a decision to enter the generic 
pharmaceutical industry is risky and complex.15 In the generic pharmaceutical industry 
success depends on the number of other generic drug manufacturers on the market, 
which affects the profit margins and volumes that each company could realize.16 Market 
saturation erodes the price-cost margins due to competition that pushes the prices 
down.16 
 
Several studies in the international arena have analyzed the dynamics of innovator’s 
products market shares and prices following loss of patent protection and subsequent 
generic entry. Suh et al. undertook a study that sought to analyze the effect of generic 
entry on price competition following the loss of patent protection in the United States of 
America (USA)’s pharmaceutical industry. Their study enrolled 35 chemical entities that 
lost patent protection between 1984 and 1987. Principally, they found that the prices of 
innovator products continued to rise following the loss of exclusivity, while the prices of 
corresponding generic drugs decreased significantly over time. They defined this 
phenomenon as Generic Competition Paradox and concluded that pricing in the 
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pharmaceutical industry is influenced by how the market is classified and defined.17 This 
finding is in contrast with the general theoretical pricing model proposed by Satterthwaite 
et al. to elucidate the effect of new firm entry on prices in monopolistically or 
oligopolistically competitive markets.18 Satterthwaite et al. postulated that entry of a new 
company into a market results in the demand curve shifting for the originator making it 
less elastic.18 Suh et al. concluded that since the conditions of competition in the 
pharmaceutical industry are complex, the general pricing theory as proposed by 
Satterthwaite et al. cannot be applied to pharmaceuticals.17 
  
In another study undertaken in the USA, Saha et al. conducted a study focusing on the 
interaction between generic entry, generic share and generic-to-brand price ratio. They 
examined 40 drugs from 9 therapeutic classes that experienced generic competition 
between July 1992 and January 1998.19 They developed an econometric model that 
describes the interaction between various key variables. They found that generic share 
and price are inextricably linked while the number of generics in the formulation market 
is a key driver of the market share and price erosion. Lastly, they found that generic 
competition is more intense for blockbuster drugs than the innovator products that had 
moderate sales whilst under patent protection.19 
  
In 2000, Hudson investigated generic uptake in Japan, United Kingdom (UK), Germany 
and the United States of America (USA) following the loss of patent protection. Using IMS 
Health data, the study enrolled 50 molecules that came off patent between 1985 and 
1996. Only the oral products, oral retard products, liquid products and topical products 
were included in the study. Hudson concluded that the market size of the innovator 
product before loss of exclusivity (LOE) was a key determinant of generic entry.20 
Elsewhere, Magazzini et al. also employed the use of IMS Health data that enrolled 269 
active ingredients across multiple countries (USA, UK, Germany and France). They also 
held that the commercial success (relative market size) of the innovator product facilitates 
generic entry. 21 
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In Belgium, Adriaen et al. investigated the pricing strategies of innovator and generics in 
the off-patent market. Their study enrolled 91 innovator products that lost patent 
protection between 2001 and 2005.22 They found that pricing strategies are influenced by 
regulatory processes, market incentives and the level of competition between the 
innovator product and multi-source products. They concluded that the complexity of the 
industry is such that there is no single strategy that spurs the pricing behavior for both the 
innovators and manufacturers of generic drugs.22  
1.1.5. Microeconomic Model for Pricing in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Supply and demand represents an economic model of price determination in a market.23 
In a competitive market, an economic equilibrium for both the price and the quantity is 
reached when the unit price for a particular good varies until it settles at a point where, at 
current prices, the quantity demanded by consumers equals the quantity supplied by 
producers.23 Supply and demand conforms to the following four basic laws: 
a) If demand rises and supply remains constant, a deficit occurs, resulting in a higher 
equilibrium price 
b) If demand declines and supply remains constant, a surplus occurs, resulting in a 
lower equilibrium price 
c) If demand remains constant and supply increases, a surplus occurs, resulting in a 
lower equilibrium price 
d) If demand remains constant and supply decreases, a shortage occurs, resulting in 
a higher equilibrium price.23  
Simply stated, it means that the lower the price of a good the greater the quantity that 
consumers are willing and able to buy.23 The economic theory dictates that both 
production costs and demand are integral parts of determining the price for a 
commodity.24 The demand curve slopes downward as the price of a commodity continues 
falling.24  
 
As seen in the foregoing literature review, there are many empirical studies in the 
international arena that have focused on the effect of price competition in the generic 
pharmaceutical industry. These studies gave rise to various models that accounts for 
interaction of various key market variables that explain the competitive dynamics of 
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pricing generic drugs in the pharmaceutical industry. A literature search and review 
indicated that there are no studies that were conducted in South Africa to understand how 
structural relationships in the market influence the pricing of generic drugs. This is despite 
having several landmark legislative reforms thus a gap in knowledge was identified.  
 
1.2. Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is articulated below following the presentation of the research 
problem, question, and hypothesis.  
1.2.1. Research Problem 
According to the National Drug Policy, generic drugs underpin the government’s plan to 
improving access to safe, efficacious and affordable quality drugs. However, the influence 
of the structural relationships (characteristics of the drug, formulation market, and the 
impact of legislative reforms) on the prices of generic drugs has not being explicitly 
accounted for. The extent to which South Africa is reliant on imported medicines can be 
attributed to, inter alia, the poor understanding of the dynamics of the local 
pharmaceutical industry such that it serves as barrier to attracting investment into the 
local generic pharmaceutical industry. 
1.2.2. Research Question 
What are the factors that influence the pricing of generic drugs in South Africa? Insofar 
as such factors are concerned, is there an association between a price of a generic drug 
and the characteristics of a drug, market and the regulatory changes? 
1.2.3. Research Hypothesis 
The legislative reforms related to the transparent pricing system have resulted in changes 
in the prices of generic drugs in South Africa. 
 
1.2.4. Research Goals 
To understand the effect of generic entry on price competition after loss of exclusivity in 
the South African pharmaceutical industry by developing a model that explains the 
structural relationships that underpins the pricing of generic drugs.  
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1.2.5. Research Objectives 
▪ To understand and describe (using descriptive statistics) the characteristics of the 
pharmaceutical market in South Africa as it pertains to the following: 
o Number of generic drug manufacturers per chemical entity that has lost its 
patent protection  
o Market size at first generic entry with respect to the sales of the innovator 
product prior to patent expiry  
o The rate of generic entry (months since expiry of patent) and how it results 
in price erosion as it relates to generic-to-innovator-price ratio 
o Prices of other generic drugs at entry 
o Therapeutic class  
o Scheduling status 
o Dosage form 
▪ To conduct a trend analysis of the pharmaceutical market with a view to establish 
whether or not the introduction of the transparent pricing system in South Africa 
had any influence on the following: 
o Number of generic drug manufacturers per chemical entity that has lost its 
patent protection  
o Market size at first generic entry with respect to the sales of the innovator 
product prior to patent expiry  
o The rate of generic entry (months since expiry of patent) and how it results 
in price erosion as it relates to generic-to-innovator-price ratio 
o Prices of other generic drugs at entry 
o Therapeutic class  
o Scheduling status 
o Dosage form 
▪ To perform a univariate analysis with a view to establish whether or not there is an 
association between a price of a generic drug and the following factors: 
o Number of generic drug manufacturers per chemical entity that has lost its 
patent protection  
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o Market size at first generic entry with respect to the sales of the innovator 
product prior to patent expiry  
o The rate of generic entry (months since expiry of patent) and how it results 
in price erosion as it relates to generic-to-innovator-price ratio 
o Prices of other generic drugs at entry 
o Therapeutic class  
o Scheduling status 
o Dosage form 
▪ Develop a multiple linear regression model to describe the correlation between the 
price of a generic drug in South Africa and the following factors: 
o Number of generic drug manufacturers per chemical entity that has lost its 
patent protection 
o Market size at first generic entry with respect to the sales of the innovator 
product prior to patent expiry 
o The rate of generic entry (months since expiry of patent) and how it results 
in price erosion as it relates to generic-to-innovator-price ratio 
o Prices of other generic drugs at entry 
o Therapeutic class 
o Scheduling status 
o Dosage form 
▪ Having identified and understood the factors that influence the pricing of generic 
drugs in South Africa, generate a detailed account of such factors with a view to: 
o Influence policy making of the Pharmaceutical Economic Evaluation Unit 
within the Department of Health 
o Support the goal of the National Drug Policy of ensuring the increased 
supply of cost-effective drugs (generics) by helping aspiring generic drug 
manufacturers to better understand the dynamics of the generic drugs 
sector and thus give them enough confidence to enter the market 
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1.3. Significance of the Study 
This study builds on prior work done in several studies conducted abroad but contributes 
to the body of knowledge in several dimensions. According to an extensive literature 
search in Nexus database system, this is the first study within the South African context 
that explicitly accounts for the structural relationships that underpin the pricing of 
generics. This study examines a relatively large sample of panel data, 204 molecules, 
over a fairly long period, 1999-2012.  
 
Secondly, the choice of the study period is instructive in appraising policy responsiveness 
following the legislative reforms. Furthermore, this study consists of the most 
comprehensive inclusion criteria and thus higher generalizability of the results. Lastly, the 
study makes a fundamental contribution to the body of knowledge in the pharmaceutical 
industry by revealing the structural relationships that spur the pricing behaviour of generic 
manufacturers in South Africa. This could potentially encourage more generic entrants 
which will stimulate competition resulting in affordable medicines and thus increased 
access. 
  
1.4. Recommendations for Further Study 
It is recommended that a study be undertaken that will develop a model for pricing generic 
drugs in South Africa by accounting for both the external and the internal variables. 
Furthermore, it is recommended that a study be done that will investigate the impact of 
pricing in the transparent pricing system wherein the consumer price index (CPI) is 
replaced by the producer price index (PPI) with a view to establish whether a PPI will be 
a fair criterion to use that accounts for the cost pressures of the pharmaceutical 
companies. Lastly, it is recommended that a study be conducted that will use the latest 
pricing data to demonstrate that the model replicates reality in terms of pricing of generic 
drugs.    
 
1.5. Limitations of the Study 
The study only accounts for the external factors that influence the pricing of generic drugs. 
This is evident in the low adjusted R2 (35.0%) as discussed in Section 5.3. Furthermore, 
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the study employs the use of historical data such data it does not offer predictive 
properties of the generic prices in the South African market.  
   
1.6. Overview of the Thesis  
The thesis comprises of six chapters. The first chapter dealt with the introduction and 
background focusing on pertinent literature with a view to identify research gaps in the 
field. More detailed literature review was done throughout as the thesis developed. This 
was followed by the purpose of the study which covered a research problem, question, 
presentation of a hypothesis as well as the research objectives in Sections 1.2.1 – 1.2.5. 
Furthermore, the chapter dealt with the significance of the study, limitations of the study 
and the overview of the thesis, Sections 1.3 – 1.5 respectively. This was followed by a 
conclusion.  
 
Chapter 2 expounds on the research methodology that underpins the study. The chapter 
consists of ten sections that dealt with the research processes that were undertaken in 
executing the study. Chapter 3 is comprised of six sections. The results provide an 
overview of the key features of the South African pharmaceutical industry. Chapter 4 
consists of five sections that deal with the impact of the transparent pricing system in 
South Africa. This is followed by Chapter 5 which is also comprised of five sections that 
covers the inferential statistics related to the development of a model for pricing generic 
drugs in South Africa. Finally, Chapter 6 presents an integrated discussion on the findings 
of the study and makes policy recommendations. The chapter is comprised of five 
sections.     
 
1.7. Conclusion 
Generic drugs are an important expenditure optimization tool that facilitates access to 
healthcare. The pharmaceutical landscape in South Africa has undergone major 
legislative reforms aimed at making medicines more affordable and by extension 
accessible. Whereas generic drugs are central to the government’s plans of ensuring the 
availability of good quality, safe, efficacious and affordable medicines; there has never 
been a study that has accounted for the intricacies of pricing generic drugs in South Africa. 
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The purpose of this study is to set up a model that explains generic competition and prices 
in South Africa by considering the influence of the structural relationships in the market. 
Whereas several studies of this nature have been conducted in the international arena, 
this is the first study that considers the South African perspective and is therefore poised 
to fill a research gap and make recommendations for pharmaceutical policy formulation.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed account of the research process that underpins the study. 
The chapter is broadly divided into ten sections. The first three sections deal with the 
research design, sources of data and the selection criteria for the study. This is followed 
by the second three sections of the chapter that deals with the processing of the data, an 
outline of the study variables as well as the analysis of data. Finally, the remaining four 
sections of the chapter focuses on the presentation of data, reliability, validity and ethical 
considerations.   
2.1. Research Design 
The orientation of this study is the positivist research paradigm that employs the 
quantitative research method using a non-experimental retrospective longitudinal design. 
WHO argues that conducting non-experimental retrospective longitudinal studies such as 
document reviews is a cost-effective way of doing research.25 Furthermore, WHO argues 
that insofar as document reviews are concerned “sales statistics provide useful 
information and can be obtained from Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS) Health 
affiliates in each country”.125 Accordingly, the current research study employed the use of 
panel data emanating from IMS Health South Africa.   
 
2.2. Sources of Data 
Two sources of data were employed in this study comprising both of a primary and 
secondary source of data.  
2.2.1. Primary Source of Data  
The primary source of data for this study was IMS Health comprising of two of their ‘off-
the shelf’ commercially available reports: Sales Audits and Market Segmentation Reports. 
The Sales Audits report presents national sales of products by pack and manufacturer. 
The prices are reported at ex-factory level. Additionally, the Sales Audit report keeps track 
of the number of units sold, revenue generated and market shares of the products. On 
the other hand, the IMS Market Segmentation report provides comprehensive information 
35 
 
on the products with respect to the dates of patent expiry for innovator products and the 
launch dates for both the innovator and generic products. 
 
For the purposes of this study, IMS Health was requested to provide a report that 
incorporated both reports (IMS Market Segmentation and Sales Audits) into an integrated 
annual series based report. This report served as a primary source of data and included 
the following variables: proprietary names, dosage forms, strengths, pack sizes, launch 
dates and patent expiry dates and monthly sales data (price, sales and market share). 
The prices were based on ex-factory prices less discounts in pre-2004 data and SEP 
(exclusive of value-added tax, VAT) post-2004. This distinction is to account for the 
differences before and after the implementation of the transparent pricing system. The 
ex-factory prices less discounts in the period preceding the introduction of the transparent 
pricing system is an equivalent of the SEP in the period following the implementation of 
the reforms.9  
 
Prior to analysis of data, VAT at 14.0% was applied to all the prices to comply with the 
legal definition of SEP. These are the prices that the pharmacies and other licensed 
dispensers in terms of section 22G of the Medicines Act obtain their medicines at. 
Additionally, the sales and prices were deflated to constant rands using 1999 as a base 
year.   
2.2.2. Secondary Source of Data 
Pharmaceutical Economic Evaluation (PEE) Unit within the NDoH served as a secondary 
source of data. The PEE Unit is required to maintain a comprehensive database of all 
medicines that are registered in South Africa. This database is a public record that is 
hosted on the website of the PEE Unit within the NDoH 
(http://www.mpr.gov.za/PublishedDocuments.aspx#DocCatId=21).  
 
The database is updated on a regular basis and keeps track of, inter alia, the following 
pertinent details of medicines: product name by proprietary and API, dosage forms, pack 
sizes, SEP, ATC codes, scheduling status, the 9-digit product nappi code, and the product 
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MCC registration number. The database was used to extract the ATC codes, scheduling 
statuses, and active ingredients with a view to supplement the primary data.  
 
2.3. Selection Criteria 
The eligibility of each case (pharmaceutical product) for inclusion or exclusion was 
assessed based on a pre-determined selection criterion.26 The study period, 1999-2012, 
was chosen to represent a period wherein major legislative reforms were enacted as 
discussed in Section 1.1. This was done with a view to establish their impact by drawing 
comparisons of the period prior to their introduction and the period following their 
introduction.   
2.3.1. Inclusion Criteria 
The inclusion criteria were based on both the patent expiry dates in the case of non-
generic drugs and product launch dates in the case of generic drugs. The criterion was 
inclusive insofar as the various dosage forms, scheduling status and therapeutic 
categories were concerned.   
 
All the innovator (non-generic) products whose patents expired between 01 January 1999 
and 31 December 2012 were included in the study. Furthermore, all the generic 
equivalents of the innovator drugs that had patent expirations during this window period 
and were launched between 01 January 1999 and 31 December 2012 were included in 
the study. Information on the registered generic drugs was based on launch dates. Given 
that every strength and dosage form of a product represents a formulation, every product 
that was launched on a different date based on a different strength and/or dosage form 
was treated as a separate case.  
2.3.2. Exclusion Criteria 
As described above, the original IMS Health data listed the expiry dates for each product. 
A Microsoft Excel custom sort function was used to sort the data based on market 
segmentation (generic or non-generic markets), followed by product expiry information in 
the case of innovator products and launch dates in the case of generic drugs. If a patent 
protection of an innovator product expired either prior to the 1st of January 1999 or after 
31st of December 2012 it was automatically excluded from the sample. Exclusion of an 
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innovator product triggered an exclusion of its associated generic drugs. However, a 
provision was made not to exclude authorized generics that entered the market prior to 
patent protection of their corresponding innovator product.  
 
In the case of generic drugs, the product launch dates were used to exclude products if 
a generic drug was registered before the 1st of January 1999, the data set did not contain 
any data post 2012. Exclusions were also applied in cases where an innovator product 
had a patent expiry date that was outside the window period but had a generic equivalent 
being registered and launched between the 1st of January 1999 and the 31st of December 
2012.  
 
Lastly, to avoid distorting the dynamics of the industry based on technical grounds insofar 
as the intellectual property rights (IPR) are concerned, the antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) 
were also excluded from the study. As seen in Section 1.1.1, this class of drugs was a 
subject of a long-protracted court battle that resulted in the ARVs being ‘genericized 
prematurely’ because of a court order that led to the issuing of compulsory licenses to 
local generic manufacturers.8  
 
2.4. Data Processing 
Data processing was carried out in three stages that involved data extraction, coding and 
data cleaning. These functions were achieved by making an extensive use of Microsoft 
Excel 2007 logical functions without using any macros.  
2.4.1. Data Extraction and Consolidation 
The data processing started with extracting data from all the separate workbooks, eight 
from IMS Health, and one from the NDoH (PEE Unit). All these data were consolidated 
into a master workbook whilst keeping them in separate worksheets. Insofar as the data 
from IMS Health was concerned, the data was organized into horizontal and vertical 
configurations. The horizontal configuration was organized into fixed columns each 
dealing with sales data on monthly basis. Each month provided an account of sales data 
as it pertains to the product’s average price per pack, monthly sales and market share 
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data per product. The vertical configuration was organized into six data layers based on 
the level of detail as shown in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1 Original Layout of IMS Health’s Data 
 
Data from various worksheets was extracted and consolidated into a master worksheet 
of a master workbook. This was done in a manner that maintained the annual organization 
and various data layers as it had been from the original workbooks. The consolidated 
worksheet and workbook served as master worksheet and master workbook respectively.  
To optimize data processing and analysis the vertical organization of the data was 
reorganized into a data matrix consisting of records in rows and variables in columns. The 
variables in columns individually described the level of data at disaggregated level as 
shown in layer six of Table 2.1 above.   
 
Each pharmaceutical product in the data matrix constituted a record. Each record 
consisted of the following variables organized into columns: product name, market 
segmentation (generic or innovator), name of the manufacturer, dosage form, strength, 
pack size, product launch date, patent expiry date, and sales data including the year in 
which such sale was made.  
 
As discussed in Section 2.2, to facilitate data analysis, it was necessary to supplement 
the primary data with pertinent variables such as active ingredients, scheduling status, 
and ATC codes from the secondary data. The original organization of the NDoH data was 
such that the products that consisted of more than one API were organized into rows. 
Prior to the extraction of the NDoH data into a master worksheet, the products with 
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multiple active ingredients were converted from a vertical listing in rows to horizontal 
listing in columns. Microsoft Excel’s IF function was used to extract the multiple 
ingredients listed in rows into columns. Another column was created where all such 
ingredients were all combined into one field with a view to optimize data processing and 
analysis. Standardization was maintained by using sequential order of active ingredients 
based on the highest strength first to the lowest strength last.  
 
The specific variables of the secondary data were extracted from their sheets in the 
master workbook into a master worksheet by making use of look up tables (match and 
index functions as well as V-look Up function). In the case of a match function, both the 
exact match and approximate match functions were used.  Follow ups were made to 
resolve cases where no matches were found.  
2.4.2. Data Coding 
Codification was employed in this study with a view to optimize data processing and to 
maintain consistency.26 
 A separate sheet was created for codification of pertinent variables. This was done by 
sorting all the data alphabetically and arranging it on an annual basis in accordance with 
the year in which the sales took place. Microsoft Excel was employed to assign unique 
numerical codes to manufacturers, market sectors, ATC, active ingredients and products.   
2.4.3.  Data Cleaning  
Neuman contends that “a researcher who has a perfect sample, perfect measures, and 
no errors in gathering data, but who makes errors in the coding process or in entering 
data into a computer, can ruin a whole research project”.26 It is for this reason that a 
carefully planned data cleaning process was undertaken. The process consisted of three 
stages starting with standardizing the codes for dosage forms, doing the dosage split and 
resolving data conflicts.  
 
The dosage forms from the primary data were standardized by application of the 
guidelines for describing and presenting dosage forms as stipulated by the PEE Unit. This 
required converting the initial dosage forms into consistent and abbreviated form with a 
view to conform to convention and to optimize dissemination of results. This task was 
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performed by copying a column with the dosage forms onto a separate worksheet where 
the standardization of codes was completed. To avoid repetition of tasks for products with 
similar dosage forms, a Microsoft Excel function of ‘remove duplicates was used. All the 
remaining dosage forms were converted into abbreviated dosage form codes by matching 
the dosage form to its corresponding code in the PEE Unit’s guidelines. Upon conclusion 
of this task, a Microsoft Excel Look Up function was applied back in the master worksheet 
with a view to standardize the codes.    
 
In accordance with Table 2.1, at layer six the original IMS Health product information with 
respect to strength, dosage form and pack size were presented as a single field. 
Furthermore, the order of these variables was not organized in a consistent manner. To 
resolve this problem, a dosage split was done in which the dosage form which had 
incorporated the strength, and the pack size was broken up into individual components.  
The dosage split was accomplished by transferring the data into a new sheet followed by 
application of the Microsoft Excel function of text to column. This resulted in the separation 
of variables that were originally in a single field into various columns. The columns that 
emanated from a dosage split consisted of the strength, pack size and dosage form. The 
data was transferred back to the master sheet.   
 
As discussed in Section 2.5, a generic drug must match the originator product based on 
a common API, dosage form, strength and by extension: ATC, and scheduling status. 
Formulation markets were created in conformance with this criterion of a generic drug. 
As such, the products were mapped by linking the generic drugs to their corresponding 
innovator products in a formulation market. This was achieved by sorting all the data 
based on a report year, API, strength, schedule, ATC category, and market segmentation.  
 
Two keys were used in the process of mapping the products. Key 1 used a less strict 
criterion whereby the link was established based on common active ingredients. On the 
other hand, key 2 was a lot more stringent in establishing the generic (s)-to-innovator 
mappings. In addition to the active pharmaceutical ingredient, it used the following as a 
criterion: dosage forms, strengths, ATC 4 codes, launch date, market segmentation and 
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scheduling status. These two keys were used as a basis of the data cleaning process. 
Where no link was found, a filter and sort function was used to deselect all the products 
whose generic (s)-to-innovator mapping was established. The remaining products were 
scrutinized for possible errors or differences based on any valid explanations.  
 
The products were transferred onto a new sheet using a copy and paste special function 
followed by a remove duplicates function. The duplicates were removed with a view to 
avoid repetition of tasks in cases where common problems existed. The remaining 
products were scrutinized for errors such as missing data, spelling mistakes and typos.  
 
There were instances where the generic (s)-to-innovator mapping could not be 
established because of mismatches based on active ingredient (s), manufacturers, 
market segmentation, and ATC codes. The mismatches were found to emanate from 
errors (e.g. spelling mistakes and typos), lack of consistency (e.g. representation of film 
coated tablets as F/C Tablets vis-a-vis Tabs FC) other reasons were related to use of 
various salts for the API etc. 
 
Where such mismatches were identified, they were resolved by standardizing the variants 
of the same variable such as all F/Cs being converted to FC followed by the application 
of a find and replace function in the master worksheet. Upon conclusion of this step the 
Microsoft Index function based on the formulas of key 1 and key 2 were repeated. This 
was done with a view to identifying cases that remained unresolved.  
 
Where there were cases that remained unresolved, a further investigation was 
undertaken to establish the reasons. In most instances, it was found that the unresolved 
cases were based on valid reasons such as a use of active ingredients by generic 
manufacturers that had salt bases that differed from the innovator products. Such a 
practice is provided for under Section 22A of the Medicines Act. Those cases were 
resolved by converting their base salts to a base exclusive of the salt.  
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As a way of an example, the product Norvasc by Pfizer Laboratories contains the active 
ingredient Amlodipine. Upon the expiration of its patent protection in April 2007, several 
generic manufacturers launched generic equivalents of Norvasc. Amongst these 
companies were companies such as Austell, Aurobindo and Dezzo Trading who all made 
use of Amlodipine Besylate. On the other hand, companies such as Dr Reddy’s Labs, 
Pharma Dynamics etc made use of yet another salt, Amlodipine Maleate. In such cases 
Key 1 (and consequently Key 2) was unable to establish a linkage between an active 
ingredient of the generic manufacturer and that of the originator product. These cases 
were resolved by converting the salts to the base and re-running the index function again.  
 
2.5. Study Variables 
Section 22A of the Medicines Act stipulates that for a drug to be deemed as an 
interchangeable multi source agent (generic drug), it needs to compare favorably with the 
corresponding innovator product insofar as the following attributes are concerned: active 
pharmaceutical ingredient (s), strength, dosage form, route of administration and 
therapeutic equivalence.27  
 
Three types of binary variables representing the characteristics of the drug were 
constructed to investigate their influence on the price of a generic drug. In addition to the 
characteristics of the drug, the study enrolled four variables that represented the 
dynamics of the market that potentially had a bearing on the price of a generic drug. 
Finally, a binary variable representing the impact of the implementation of the legislative 
reforms was also enrolled into the study. 
2.5.1. Type of Drug Market 
In accordance with Section 22A of the Medicines Act27, active pharmaceutical ingredients 
are assigned into different schedules based on their risk-benefit relationship, Table 2.2. 
In terms of the type of the drug market, Schedules 0 – 2 are classified as the over-the-
counter medicines. On the other hand, Schedule 3 – 6 medicines form part of the 
prescription drug market. As discussed in Section 2.5.2, the prescription only drugs can 
be further subdivided into those that treat acute diseases and those that are used to treat 
chronic diseases.  
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Finally, the type of drug market has a bearing on the length of treatment which potentially 
influences the price of a generic drug.28 Scheduling statuses formed part of the variables 
that the study collected for every medicinal product that met the selection criteria. The 
inclusion of scheduling statuses sought to establish whether the type of drug market had 
an influence on generic entry, the number of generic competitors and the price of a 
generic drug.    
Table 2.2 Summary of the Schedules of Medicines.  
Scheduling Status Condition of Sale 
Schedule 0 Sold in any retail outlet 
Schedule 1 - 2 Sold by a pharmacist 
Schedule 3 - 4 Prescription is required, repeatable for 6 months 
Schedule 5 Prescription is required, no repeats allowed  
Schedule 6 Prescription is required, no repeats allowed 
Schedule 7 Controlled Substances 
Schedule 8 Strictly Controlled Substances 
Adapted from: Business Monitor International (BMI), Q3 2012 
2.5.2. Type of Drug Therapy  
The international classification of diseases in terms of the anatomical therapeutic 
chemical (ATC) system29 was employed in this research study with a view to establish 
the influence of the type of drug therapy on the price of a generic drug. All the medicines 
that met the selection criteria were grouped according to their 1–digit ATC (ATC1) 
classification with a view to understand general trends by therapeutic category.  
 
Furthermore, the 3-digit ATC (ATC3) classification in terms of acute or chronic as 
published by the WHO30 was employed with a view to establish if the type of drug therapy 
influences the price of a generic drug. Finally, the study included a variable that conveys 
information about the 4-digit ATC (ATC4) classification of all the medicines that met the 
inclusion criteria. Based on the ATC4 data the study investigated whether having closely 
related chemical entities (me-too drugs)31 in the same therapeutic category had any 
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bearing on the prices of generic drugs. Table 2.3 below provides an example of the ATC 
system for the drugs that act on the alimentary canal. 
 
Table 2.3 Example of Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classification 
Levels 
ATC 
Code Level of Detail Criterion of Classification 
Level 1 A 
Alimentary Tract  
and Metabolism Main Anatomical Group 
Level 2 A10 Drugs Used in Diabetes Main Therapeutic Group 
Level 3 A10B 
Oral Blood-Glucose  
Lowering Drugs 
Therapeutic/Pharmacological 
Subgroup 
Level 4 A10BA 
Sulphonamides,  
Urea Derivatives 
Chemical/Therapeutic/ 
Pharmacological Subgroup 
Level 5 A10BA02 Glibenclamide Subgroup for Chemical Substance 
   Adopted from: South African Medicines Formulary (SAMF), 12th Edition 
2.5.3. Complexity of Manufacture of a Pharmaceutical Dosage Form 
The study included information about a dosage form of all the products that met the 
selection criteria. The influence of pharmaceutical dosage forms on the price of a generic 
drug was investigated. Aulton argues that the design of a pharmaceutical dosage form 
must account for such factors as biopharmaceutical properties, physicochemical 
properties, and its therapeutic properties.32 Inherent in the choice of the dosage form are 
the challenges that are associated with the technical aspects (skills, technology, capital 
etc) of manufacture that has a bearing on the price of a drug.33 The study investigated 
the influence of the complexity of manufacture of a dosage form on generic entry and on 
the price of a generic drug.  
2.5.4. Order of Generic Entry into the Formulation Market 
The difference (months) between the expiration date of a patent of an innovator product 
and the date of entry of a corresponding generic drug was computed. The rate of generic 
entry was used to establish the order of generic entry into a formulation market and how 
it influences the prices of generic drugs.  
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2.5.5. Impact of the Legislative Reforms 
As discussed in Section 1.1.1, the South African government was obliged by Section 
27(2) of the constitution to reform the healthcare sector to progressively move towards 
the realization of the right to healthcare as espoused under Section 27(1) of the 
constitution. Accordingly, a wide range of policy interventions with a view to facilitate 
affordability of medicines and thus improve access were undertaken. Government 
Gazette No. 24279 assented to in January 2003 introduced such instruments as 
mandatory generic substitution, provisions for the introduction of the marketing code, and 
the transparent pricing system to the Medicines Act. On the other hand, Government 
Gazette No. 24256 which was also assented to in January 2003 introduced Section 69(A) 
to the Patents Act, No. 57 of 1978. As discussed in Section 1.1.1, this reform (also known 
as the Bolar amendment) was introduced with a view to facilitate a timeous entry of 
generics following the loss of patent protection.  
Collectively the various instruments that were introduced by the government over time 
begun working in tandem in 2005 following the judgement by the constitutional court on 
the implementation of the transparent pricing system.8 A cumulative impact of the 
legislative reforms was investigated by dividing the market into the period before and after 
the 31st of December 2004. Specifically, the study investigated the impact of the 
legislative reforms on generic entry, rate of generic entry, price erosion, average unit price 
of a medicine, type of drug therapy, type of drug market and the complexity of 
manufacture of a pharmaceutical dosage form. 
 
2.6. Data Analysis 
Both the descriptive and inferential statistical procedures were employed to subject the 
data to analysis using Statistica 13.2.  
2.6.1.  Descriptive Data Analysis 
The use of descriptive statistics techniques reduced numerous observations into a 
descriptive summary (presented as frequency tabulations for categorical variables; and 
either means with standard deviation or median with inter-quartile range for continuous 
variables) that revealed the parameters of interest about the South African 
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pharmaceutical industry.26 Univariate descriptive statistics is a technique that describes 
variables of interest by focusing on one variable at the time.26 Univariate descriptive 
statistics were conducted for the number of generic drug manufacturers per chemical 
entity following loss of patent protection, market size of the innovator product prior to loss 
of exclusivity, price erosion, therapeutic categories, and dosage forms. Bivariate 
descriptive statistics were employed to draw a comparative analysis (association) 
between the above-mentioned variables before and after the implementation of the 
pricing reforms.  
 
An overall picture of these research variables provided an insight into the preferences of 
generic drug manufacturers in South Africa. Disproportionate distribution in the market 
with respect to market variables could suggest that certain markets would be less 
competitive than others. This has significant policy implications, as less competitive 
markets result in high prices which raise questions about affordability and access to 
drugs.34 Being able to account for these factors is instructive in policy-making.   
2.6.2. Inferential Data Analysis 
Inferential statistics were employed in this study with a view to explain the influence of the 
characteristics of the drug, market and legislative reforms on the price of a generic drug. 
This involved the use of techniques such as analysis of variance (ANOVA), correlational 
analysis, crosstabulation analyses, and regression analysis.  
 
ANOVA was used extensively to establish whether there is a statistically significant 
difference between the study variables before and after the implementation of the 
transparent pricing system. If the ANOVA results were significant, the post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD was used to investigate where the differences lie. 
Where the study variables were categorical measures, cross-tabulations were used to 
establish the impact of the transparent pricing system on study variables. On the other 
hand, correlational analysis was employed to study the strength and the nature of the 
linear relationship between the price of a generic drug and the study variables with 
continuous measures. Finally, linear regression analysis comprising of both univariate 
regression and multivariate regression was employed to establish the influence of the 
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study variables (independent variables) on the price of a generic drug, dependent 
variable. Variables that were significant on the univariate analysis were considered in the 
multivariate regression where they were adjusted for each other. Significance was 
considered at 5% level. 
 
2.7. Data Presentation 
The results of the data analysis for this study were presented by means of graphs, tables 
(ordinary tables and cross-tabulations) and by means of statistical summaries such as 
correlation coefficients, means with standard deviations, medians with range etc.  
 
2.8. Reliability 
To ensure the reliability of the study results, several measures were put in place 
comprising of the clear conceptualization of constructs, increasing the level of 
measurement and use of multiple indicators of a variable.26  
2.8.1.  Clear Conceptualization of Constructs 
Constructs should be specified with a view to remove noise from other constructs. This 
requires a single construct or sub-dimension of a construct to be measured in such a way 
that each measure indicates one and only concept.26 In this study scheduling status as it 
relates to the level of restriction on access to a drug was examined to establish its impact 
on the price of a generic drug. However, given the fact that a schedule can cater for drugs 
with a wide range of therapeutic applications with different disease incidences and thus 
different dynamics, an ATC group was introduced to the regression model to accentuate 
this effect.   
2.8.2. Increase in the Level of Measurement 
It is critical that specific information is measured so that it becomes less likely that 
anything other than the construct will be captured.26 The ease of manufacture as it relates 
to dosage design has an influence on generic entry and thus the price competition.33 To 
establish the impact of a dosage design on the price of a generic drug, a dosage form 
instead of a route of administration was employed with a view to increasing the level of 
measurement. 
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2.9. Validity 
Every research design is susceptible to bias and design threats which can adversely 
affect the internal validity (i.e., accuracy) and external validity (i.e., generalizability) of the 
study results from the population where the sample was derived.26 Furthermore, research 
design must also make provisions for construct validity, and statistical validity.26  
2.9.1. Internal Validity 
Longitudinal studies have been described as most likely to be susceptible to the following 
internal validity threats: maturity, history, testing, instrumentation, statistical regression, 
selection, and attrition. In this study, these specific internal validity threats were mitigated 
as outlined below. 
a) Maturation 
The collection of 13 years’ pharmaceutical sales data allows for robust examination of 
trends and dynamics. Neumann argues that it is not uncommon for variables obtained 
from document reviews to undergo definitional and standardization changes over a 
period.26 The researcher addressed the internal validity of the data by holding meetings 
with the provider of the primary data (IMS Health) with a view to circumvent possible 
challenges related to changes in data definitions, reporting practices, technical aspects 
of the report, and consistency of measurements. 
b) History 
History entails the events that affect the dependent variable that occurs between the 
measurements.26 Innovator companies for ARVs were compelled by a court order in 2003 
to issue compulsory licenses to local generic manufacturers to produce generic 
equivalents of their products.8 This ‘premature’ generic entry of ARVs to the market was 
deemed as likely to confound the ‘natural’ trends of the industry as it relates to price 
erosion. To mitigate this, the ARVs were excluded from the sample.  
c) Instrumentation 
Any changes to a data collection device may result in changes in the measurement of the 
dependent variable.26 The accuracy of data collection was safeguarded by making use of 
IMS Health which is a reputable international organization with validated and highly 
sophisticated data collection tools and systems. IMS Health data is recognized by the 
WHO as a mainstay in conducting health research on use of pharmaceuticals.25  
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d) Selection Bias 
Selection bias arises when the sample has components that are not equivalent to each 
other.26 The selection of the study period, 1999-2012, represents two different eras in the 
pricing of pharmaceutical products in South Africa, i.e., the before and after 
implementation. To mitigate against selection bias, a study objective that seeks to probe 
the actual differences that are associated with these two eras was installed by 
performance of an ANOVA. Additionally, an inclusive criterion with respect to dosage 
forms, schedules and therapeutic classes was employed.  
 
2.10. Ethical Consideration 
The study did not involve human subjects and as such a waiver for ethical clearance was 
obtained, Appendix A. 
 
2.11. Conclusion 
This chapter provided the scientific rationale behind the research methodology that 
underpinned the study. The chapter also dealt with the ethical considerations related to 
executing.  Since the study did not involve human subjects a waiver for ethics’ clearance 
was sought and granted.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
This chapter provides a comprehensive description of the structural characteristics of the 
South African pharmaceutical industry. The chapter comprises of five sections. Section 
3.1 deals with the application of the selection criteria for the study and provides a 
summary of the key statistics. Section 3.2 provides descriptive statistics of the study 
variables. Section 3.3 expounds on the shifts in market segmentation of the local 
pharmaceutical industry. This is followed by an appraisal of the emerging themes in the 
local pharmaceutical industry in Section 3.4. Generic fending off strategies are presented 
in Section 3.5 followed by a discussion and conclusion in Section 3.6 and Section 3.7 
respectively.   
3.1. Application of the Selection Criteria 
The primary data from IMS Health covering private sector sales for the period 01/01/1999-
31/12/2012 had a total of 63763 products. Upon application of the selection criteria, 53477 
products were excluded from the study based on falling outside the window period for this 
study with respect to the expiry dates of the patents and launch dates of the generic 
drugs. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the main study’s variables. A total of 549 
innovator products whose patent protection expired between 1999 and 2012 were 
enrolled into the study. In addition to the innovator products, there were 970 generic drugs 
that were also enrolled in the study resulting in a total of 1519 products. The prices of 
these 1519 products were appraised on an annual basis resulting in a grand total of 10286 
(n = 5660 for innovators and n = 4626 for generics) cases being included for the duration 
of the study, 1999 to 2012.  
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Table 3.1 Overview of the Pharmaceutical Market, 1999 - 2012 
Overview of the Pharmaceutical Market Generics Sector Innovators Sector 
Number of Chemical Entities 
 (at molecular level) 97 204 
Number of Innovator Products that Lost 
Patent Protection (formulation level)  - 549 
Number of Pharmaceutical Products                                                           
(formulation level) 970 549 
Number of Pharmaceutical Companies  48 38 
Number of Dosage Forms 21 44 
Number of Schedules 5 6 
Number of ATC 4 58 111 
 
3.2. Description of the Characteristics of the South African Pharmaceutical 
Industry  
The features of the pharmaceutical industry that have a bearing on the pricing of generic 
drugs in South Africa are appraised in the forthcoming sections.  
3.2.1. Number of Generic Drug Manufacturers Per Chemical Entity Following the 
Loss of Exclusivity (LOE) 
Figure 3.1 shows the rates of patent expirations and generic entry; sub-optimal levels of 
generic entry are evident in that less than half of all chemical entities that lost patent 
protection attracted generic entry; Table 3.1. The annual rate of patent expirations was 
an average of 39.2 patents (SD = 4.7 patents) for the period spanning 1999 to 2012. The 
patents had varying rates of expirations, ranging from 7 patent expirations in 2009 to 65 
patent expirations in 1999. The launch dates ranged from May 1982 to March 2012. The 
earliest expiry date was Jan 1999 and the latest expiry date was Nov 2012. The average 
effective patent life was 9.24 years (SD = 3.95 years) with a minimum of 2 months for 
Perdix® (Moexipril) and a maximum of 19.6 years for Clexane® (Enoxaparin).  
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Figure 3.1 Rates of Patent Expirations and Generic Entry 
 
As outlined in Table 3.1, there were 970 generic equivalents for the 549 innovator 
products that were previously covered by patents. On average, there were 4.39 generic 
drug versions (SD = 3.69 generic drug versions) for every chemical entity that lost patent 
protection and resulted in generic entry for the period spanning 1999 to 2012.  
 
There was a high degree of variability in terms of the annual entry rate of generics, on 
average 46 generics (SD = 45 generics) entered the pharmaceutical market per annum 
ranging from 1 generic drug in 1999 to 134 generics in 2008. As shown in Table 3.2, there 
were 25 generics that entered the market prior to loss of patent protection. The earliest 
generic entrants ranged from -180 months for Ramace® (Ramipril) to -1 month for 
Foxair® (Fluticasone) before patent expiry.  
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Table 3.2 Authorized Generics, 1999 - 2012 
 
   
3.2.2. Market Size of the Innovator Product in the Year Preceding LOE 
Figure 3.2 depicts a relationship between the sales of innovator products a year preceding 
patent expiration and the average number of generic entrants. Save for the range R29.0M 
to R 32.1M the higher the sales of innovator products in the year preceding loss of 
exclusivity the higher the number of generic entrants. The sales of the innovator products 
in the category R29.0M to R 32.1M were found to comprise of technologically advanced 
dosage forms such as accuhalers, inhalers, transdermal patches, slow release tablets 
and capsules.  
Chemical Entity
Company of the 
Generic Innovator Company
 Months to 
Patent 
Expiry
Expiry 
Date 
Launch 
Date Type
Lisinopril MSD Astrazeneca -121 Dec-99 Nov-89 Own Generic
Ceftazidime Elli Lilly Elli Lilly -113 May-99 Dec-89 Own Generic
Ramipril Astrazeneca Sanofi-Aventis -180 Apr-05 Apr-90
Multinationals: 
Sanofi-Aventis
Loratadine MSD MSD -116 Jun-01 Oct-91 Own Generic
Loratadine MSD MSD -41 Jun-01 Jan-98 Own Generic
Loratadine MSD MSD -2 Jun-01 Apr-01 Own Generic
LoratadinePseudoephedrine MSD Msd -56 Jun-01 Oct-96 Own Generic
Pantoprazole Nycomed Nycomed -128 Jun-05 Oct-94 Own Generic
Lomefloxacin Aspen Pharmacare Glaxosmithkline -99 Sep-04 Jun-96 Own Generic
IbuprofenPseudoephedrine Sandoz Novartis -96 Apr-05 Apr-97 Subidiary of Norvatis
Norfloxacin Cipla Medro Astrazeneca -43 Jul-01 Dec-97 Licensee
Mometasone MSD MSD -116 Sep-07 Jan-98 Own Generic
Etoposide Pfizer Laboratories Pfizer Laboratories -110 Jul-08 May-99 Own Generic
Diclofenac Adcock Ingram Norvatis -70 Apr-07 Jun-01 Licensee
Perindopril Biogaran Servier Laboratories -53 Apr-08 Nov-03 Subsidiary of Servier
Amlodipine Pharma Dynamics Pfizer Laboratories -29 Apr-07 Nov-04 Licensee
Clarithromycin Aspen Pharmacare Abbott Laboratories -2 Mar-05 Jan-05 Licensee
PerindoprilIndapamide Servier Laboratories Servier Laboratories -30 Apr-08 Oct-05
Self and Subsidiary 
(Biogran)
Valsartan Novartis Novartis -59 Feb-11 Mar-06
Self and Subsidiary 
(Sandoz)
Atorvastatin Pharmacia Corporat Pfizer Laboratories -39 Jul-10 Apr-07 Subidiary of Pfizer
Irbesartan Sanofi-Aventis Sanofi-Aventis -21 Mar-11 Jun-09 Own Generic
IrbesartanHydrochlorothiazide Sanofi-Aventis Sanofi-Aventis -21 Mar-11 Jun-09 Own Generic
Telmisartan Boehringer Ingelheim Boehringer Ingelheim -22 Feb-12 Apr-10 Own Generic
TelmisartanHydrochlorothiazide Boehringer Ingelheim Boehringer Ingelheim -22 Feb-12 Apr-10 Own Generic
Estradiol Novartis Glaxosmithkline -3 Oct-10 Jul-10 Another Innovator
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Figure 3.2 Sales of the Innovator Products a Year Preceding LOE,1999 - 2012 
 
Table 3.3 shows the Top 40 sales of the innovator products over a 5-year period following 
the loss of patent protection, the remainder of the 184 innovator products are shown in 
Appendix B. The passage of time results in decline in sales due to competition from either 
generic drugs and/or close-substitutes. Innovator products with annual sales of less than 
a million rands tIn describing the local pharmaceutical market the author also focused end 
to exit the market within 3 years of loss of exclusivity.  
 
Within the first 3 years following the loss of patent protection, a quarter of all innovator 
products (26.5%, n = 54) left the market. Eleven innovator products (20.4%) left the 
market in the first year following the loss of their patent protection. Three (27.3%) and 9 
(81.8%, n = 11) of these products experienced competition from generic drugs and close-
substitutes respectively. The innovator products that left the market within a year of patent 
expiry had average sales of R 2.31M (SD = R 4.86M) and R 0.05M (SD = R 0.003M) in 
the year preceding their loss of patent expiry and at patent expiry respectively.   
 
Overall sales of the innovator products plummeted by 11.8% (n = R 481.4M) at the end 
of the first year following the loss of patent protection. Despite not experiencing 
competition from neither generics nor other chemical entities in the same therapeutic 
group, Halofantrine (ATC 4, P01BX), Atovaquone (ATC 4, P01BX) and Zanamivir (ATC 
4, J05AH) left the market in the first year following the loss of patent protection. Products 
that act on the cardiovascular system had the highest exit rate (36.4%, n = 11); only one 
of these products experienced a self-induced generic competition. Abbott replaced 
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Gopten® (Trandolapril, ATC 4 C09AA) with its own generic product, Mavik®. The 
remainder of the other innovator products that act on the cardiovascular system had no 
generic competition.  
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Table 3.3 Performance of Innovator Products After Loss of Exclusivity, 1999 – 2012 
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The anti-infectives and antiparasitic categories had two drugs apiece that left the market 
in the first year following the loss of patent expiry. One product of the anti-infectives, 
Cedax® (Ceftibuten, ATC 4 J01DD) experienced competition from 3 other products in the 
same therapeutic class without experiencing generic competition. The second anti-
infective (Relenza® [Zanamivir, ATC 4 J015AH]) did not experience competition from 
neither close substitutes nor generic drugs. On the other hand, neither of the antiparasitic 
drugs (Wellvone® [Atovaquone, ATC 4 P01AX)]) and Halfan® [Halofantrine, ATC 4 
P01BX]) experienced competition from either generics or close-substitutes.  
 
The second year following the loss of patent protection resulted in overall sales of 
innovator products falling by 27.3% from their original sales at patent expiry. Forty four 
percent (n = 54) of the innovator products that left the market exited in the second year 
following the loss of their patent protection. Their average sales in the year preceding the 
loss of their exclusivity was R 1.4M (SD = R 2.9M). Four products apiece belonged to the 
sensory organs therapeutic class and the anti-infectives. Two of the products Okacyn® 
(Lomefloxacin) and Voltaren Opthalmic ® (Diclofenac)) that act on the sensory organs 
experienced generic entry from both generics and other chemical entities in the same 
therapeutic class, S01AX and S01BC respectively. The other two products Trusopt® 
(Dorzolamide) and Rhinolast® (Azelastine)) that act on the sensory organs did not 
experience competition from generics but from other products in the same therapeutic 
classes, S01EC and S01GX respectively.  
 
Two of the anti-infectives Azactam® (Aztreonam, ATC 4 J01DF) and Baraclude® 
(Entecavir, ATC 4 J05AF)) that left the market in the second year following the loss of 
their patent protection did not experience competition from either generics or other 
chemical entities in the same therapeutic class. The other two anti-infectives Lorabid® 
(Loracarbef, ATC 4 J01DC) and Noroxin® (Norfloxacin, J01MA)) experienced 
competition from other chemical entities in the same therapeutic classes as them. 
Additionally, Noroxin® experienced generic competition from generics as well.  
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Furthermore, three products apiece left the market in the second year following the loss 
of their patent protection, these were antineoplastic agents, drugs that act on the 
alimentary tract and the respiratory system. Except for Etopophos® (Etoposide, ATC 4 
L01CB) which experienced generic competition, all other antineoplastic drugs Leustatin® 
(Cladribine, ATC 4 L01BB) and Suprefact® (Buserelin, ATC 4 L02AE) did not experience 
competition from either close-substitutes or generics. Only Dipentum® (Olsalazine, ATC 
A07EC) lacked competition from both the generics and close-substitutes. The remaining 
two products (Antizid® (Nizatidine, ATC A02BA) and Navoban® (Tropisetron, ATC 4 
A04AA) that act on the alimentary canal experienced competition from close-substitutes.  
None of the drugs that act on the alimentary canal experienced competition from generic 
drugs. 
 
None of the drugs that act on the respiratory system experienced generic competition. 
Only Tilade M® (Nedocromil, ATC 4 R03BB) experienced competition from close-
substitutes. The other two drugs that act on the respiratory tract Accolate® (Zafirlukast, 
ATC 4 R03DC) and Semprex® (Acravastine, ATC R06AX) did not experience competition 
from either generic drugs or close-substitutes. Additionally, there were two products 
apiece that belonged to the therapeutic class dermatologicals and central nervous 
system. None of the products Nizovules® (Ketoconazole) and Elidel® (Pimecrolimus) that 
belong to the dermatologicals experienced competition from close-substitutes. Only 
Elidel® experienced generic competition. On the other hand, none of the products that 
belong to the central nervous system Naramig® (Naratriptan, ATC 4 N02CC) and 
Rilutek® (Riluzole, ATC 4 N07XX) experienced competition from neither generics nor 
close-substitutes.  
 
Finally, there was one product apiece that belonged to the antiparasitic Co-artem® 
(ArtemetherLumefan, ATC 4 P01BE), cardiovascular system Zanidip® (Lercanidipine, 
ATC 4 C08CA) and genitourinary system Estracombitis TTS® (EstrogensNorethist, ATC 
4 G03CA). None of these products experienced generic competition. Except for Co-
artem®, the other two cardiovascular drugs did not experience competition from close-
substitutes. In the second year following the loss of patent protection, there were 39 
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innovator products whose sales declined by between 97.0% and 61.0%. The average 
sales of these products in the year preceding loss of their patent protection was R 1.86M 
(SD = R 2.10M).  
 
Five drugs in the worst performing category belonged to the cardiovascular system (ATC 
C), 4 drugs apiece acted on the alimentary canal (ATC A), skin (dermatologicals, ATC D), 
antineoplastic drugs (ATC L), musculoskeletal system (ATC M), central nervous system 
(ATC N), and drugs that acts on the sensory organs (ATC S). There were 27 innovator 
products that left the market by the end of their second year following the loss of their 
patent protection. Only 11.1% (n = 27) had experienced generic competition whereas 
55.6% (n = 27) of these molecules faced competition from close-substitutes. Albeit 
competition from Adco-Simvastatin, Zocor posted a 10.94% increase in sales from R 
78.6M in 2001 to R 87.2M in 2003. No other products experienced a growth in their sales 
in their second year following the loss of patent protection. 
 
There were 14 innovator products (25.9%, n = 54) that left the market at the end of the 
third year following the loss of their patent protection. These products had average sales 
of R 0.98M (SD = R 0.39M) and R 0.83M (SD = R 0.14M) in the year preceding their loss 
of patent expiry and at patent expiry respectively. Overall sales of the innovator products 
contracted by 39.2% (n = R 4079.6M) at the end of the third year following the loss of 
patent protection. None of these molecules had experienced competition from generics. 
Thirty six percent (n = 14) of these molecules also did not experience competition from 
close substitutes.  
 
The drugs that act on the central nervous system (Zolmitriptan, N02CC), (Entacapone, 
N04BX) and (Rivastigmine, N06DA)) dominated the list of products that left the market in 
the third year following the loss of their patent protection. Two drugs apiece belonged to 
the cardiovascular system (Esmolol, C07AA) and FosinoprilHydrochloride, C09BA)), anti-
infectives (Enoxacin, J01MA) and (Ganciclovir, J05AB), antineoplastic (Topotecan, 
L01XX) and Tacrolimus, L04AD) and the sensory organs (Fucidic acid, S01AA) and 
Brinzolamide, S01EC). Finally, there was one drug that acts on the musculoskeletal 
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system (Pamidronic acid, M05BA), respiratory system (Mizolastine, R06AX), and 
Cinacalcet (H05BX) which is a systemic hormonal preparation. 
 
On the other hand, 39 products posted considerable losses of the market share with their 
sales declining by between 97.4.0% to 61.5%. Thirteen percent (n = 39) of the products 
that left the market in the third year following the loss of their exclusivity belonged to the 
cardiovascular system. Four products apiece belonged to the dermatologicals, 
antineoplastic preparations, musculoskeletal system, central nervous system, sensory 
organs, and alimentary canal. Three products apiece belonged to the anti-infectives and 
genitourinary system and sex hormones. One product apiece belonged to the systemic 
hormonal preparations and blood and blood-forming organs therapeutic classes. None of 
the innovator products experienced a growth in their sales by the end of the third year 
following the loss of their exclusivity. 
3.2.3. The Impact of Generic Entry on Price Erosion 
Figure 3.3 shows the aggregate impact of a specified number of generic drugs on price 
erosion. The higher the number of generic drugs the greater the price erosion.  
 
Figure 3.3 - Generic Entry and Price Erosion, 1999 - 2012. 
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3.2.4. Prices of Other Generic Drugs at Entry 
The entry prices of generic drugs in the same formulation market were computed with a 
view to establish whether the prices of the foregoing entrants have a bearing on the price 
of the new entrant. An average entry price of other generic drugs in the same formulation 
market was found to be R2.54 (SD = R3.97). 
3.2.5. Frequency Distributions of Therapeutic Categories 
Table 3.4 depicts the market shares by value for the total pharmaceutical market (TPM), 
innovators’ market and the generics’ market. There were no differences in the rankings 
of the market shares by the ATC 1 system between the innovators products and the TPM. 
The most dominant therapeutic class in the total pharmaceutical market and the 
innovators’ market were the general anti-infectives (ATC J) which accounted for 26.0% 
(n = 257) of the market by value. By contrast, the anti-infectives ranked 3rd (3.01%, n = 
24) in the generics market. Except for the generics market, the drugs that work on the 
cardiovascular system ranked second in terms of the ATC 1 categories for both the TPM 
market as well as the innovators. They accounted for 24.3% (n = 445) of the market share 
by value whereas the drugs for cardiovascular disease ranked 1st (8.07%, n = 330) in the 
generics market. 
 
Similarly, there were further differences in the rankings of the remainder of the Top 5 
therapeutic classes by value between the generics market and the markets of the 
innovators and the overall market. The drugs belonging to the central nervous system 
(ATC class N) and the respiratory system (ATC class R) ranked 3rd (18.1%, n = 291) and 
4th (9.66%, n = 130) in the innovators’ market as well as the total pharmaceutical market 
by value respectively. The corresponding rankings for the generics’ market were 4th 
(2.36%, n = 83) for the central nervous system and 5th (0.97%, n = 1) for the respiratory 
drugs.  
 
Finally, the Top 5 ATC 1 categories comprised of the drugs for the alimentary canal (ATC 
class A), the accounted for 8.68% (n = 162) by value for the innovators market and the 
total pharmaceutical market respectively. The drugs for the alimentary canal ranked 2nd 
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(3.14%, n = 112) for the generics’ market by value. There was no generic representation 
for the anti-parasitic products, insecticides and repellents (ATC class P) as well as various 
(ATC class V).  
 
Table 3.4 Leading Therapeutic Classes, 1999 – 2012 
 
3.2.6. Frequency Distributions of Dosage Forms 
Table 3.5 shows the Top 20 dosage forms by value; the results suggest that a handful of 
dosage forms drive the market. The top 10 pharmaceutical dosage forms accounts for 
93.3% (n = R44724.6M), 92.2% (n = R36220.7M) and 99.4% (n = R8503.9M) for the total 
pharmaceutical market, innovators and generics markets respectively. Table 3.5 
indicates that 5 dosage forms accounts for 97.5% of all the dosage forms in the generics' 
market. The most prominent dosage form were the tablets that accounted for three-
quarters of the market (75.7%, n = R8503.9M) by value. This was followed by capsules 
and injections at 13.5% (n = R8503.9M) 6.50% (n = R8503.9M) respectively.  
  
Rank Market Share (Value) N Rank Market Share (Value) N Rank Market Share (Value) N
J Anti-infectives for systemic use 1 26.0% 257 1 23.0% 95 3 3.01% 24
C Cardiovascular system 2 24.3% 445 2 16.2% 115 1 8.07% 330
N Central Nervous system 3 18.1% 291 3 15.7% 103 4 2.36% 83
R Respiratory system 4 9.66% 130 4 8.69% 47 5 0.97% 1
A Alimentary tract and metabolism 5 8.65% 162 5 5.51% 50 2 3.14% 112
M Musculo-skeletal system 6 3.66% 60 6 2.88% 31 6 0.78% 188
L Antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents 7 2.99% 49 7 2.87% 25 8 0.12% 29
D Dermatologicals 8 2.37% 52 8 2.06% 27 7 0.30% 25
B Blood and blood forming organs 9 1.75% 17 9 1.65% 11 9 0.10% 6
G Genito-urinary system and sex hormones 10 0.97% 29 10 0.87% 19 9 0.10% 9
H Systemic hormonal preparations, excluding sex hormones 11 0.73% 8 11 0.73% 8 - 0.00% 162
S Sensory organs 12 0.56% 13 12 0.51% 12 10 0.06% 1
P Antiparasitic products, insecticides and repellents 13 0.27% 4 13 0.27% 4 - 0.00% 0
V Various 14 0.04% 2 14 0.04% 2 - 0.00% 0
ATC 1 Code Description
Total Pharmaceutical Market Innovators Generics
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 Table 3.5 Leading Dosage Forms, 1999 – 2012 
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3.3. Market Segmentation of the South African Pharmaceutical Industry 
The breakdown of the pharmaceutical industry by sector in terms of its sales by value 
was conducted with a view to understand the segmentation in the context of the sector’s 
responsiveness to legislative reforms.  
3.3.1. Market Segmentation by Pharmaceutical Companies 
Notwithstanding the fact that the innovator companies held just a fifth of the market share 
by value, they had a considerably low number of products in their portfolios; Table 3.6. 
The product portfolios of each company in the different markets were M = 23 (SD = 33, 
range = 176), M = 20 (SD = 29, range = 109) and M = 14 (SD = 18, range = 66) for the 
total pharmaceutical market, generics’ and innovators’ markets respectively. Both Aspen 
Pharmacare and Sandoz had 110 products apiece which represented the highest number 
of products in a portfolio of a company in all the markets. This paradoxical difference is 
indicative of the high average unit price for the innovator products in comparison to the 
generics as shown in Table 5.1.  
 
As depicted in Table 3.6, the Top 4 and Top 20 companies accounted for 42.4% and 
98.4% of the generics market by value respectively. The 4 leading generic companies 
controlled 59.4% of the market by value with minor differences between the two leading 
companies, Cipla-Medro (18.7%, n = R1591.1M) and Aspen Pharmacare (18.8%, n = 
R1602.1M). Save for Sandoz the remainder of these companies are South African by 
origin and were all listed in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) by end of 2012. The 
Top 4 and Top 20 companies accounted for 49.8% (n = R 18029.1M) and 98.1% of the 
innovators’ market by value correspondingly.  
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Table 3.6 Top 20 Leading Pharmaceutical Companies, 1999 – 2012. 
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3.3.2. Market Segmentation by Pharmaceutical Products 
As shown in Table 3.7, there were no differences in the 11 top ranked products between 
the innovators market and the total pharmaceutical market by value. Insofar as the total 
pharmaceutical market is concerned, the 12th ranked (1.41%, n = R 44714.6M) product 
(Adco-Simvastatin) by value, was ranked 1st in the generics’ market. Notably, Adco-
Simvastatin was the only generic product in the total pharmaceutical market of the Top 
20 products by value.  
 
The generics sector appeared to be primarily driven by a handful of products by value, 
The Top 20 ranked generic products accounted for just over half of the market (51.7%, 
R8503.9M) by value for the period 1999 to 2012. Adco-Simvastatin (Simvastatin) and 
Ciprobay (Ciprofloxacin) as bestselling drugs for the generics’ market and innovators’ 
market respectively had sales that were 37 (7.42%, n = R8503.9M) and 12 (5.46%, n = 
R36220.7M) times more than their respective industry’s average by value. As seen in 
Table 3.7, Simvastatin as a chemical entity jointly held the second position with 
Amlodipine in terms of having the highest number of generic equivalents. Both chemical 
entities (Simvastatin and Amlodipine) attracted 16 generic entrants whereas Ciprofloxacin 
attracted 15 generic entrants.  
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Table 3.7 Top 20 Pharmaceutical Products, 1999 – 2012 
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3.3.3. Shifts in the Market Segmentation of the South African Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
Figure 3.4 provides a graphical representation of the shifting patterns of the local 
pharmaceutical industry. The industry was previously dominated by the innovator 
companies. However, the generic sector of the market has since gained traction and is 
demonstrably growing at a steady rate.   
 
Figure 3.4 Market Segmentation of the Local Industry, 1999 - 2012. 
 
  
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Innovators 86% 84% 84% 80% 79% 72% 71% 67% 61% 60% 59% 61% 54% 48%
Generics 14% 16% 16% 20% 21% 28% 29% 33% 39% 40% 41% 39% 46% 52%
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3.4. Emerging Themes in the South African Pharmaceutical Industry 
A description of the nuanced features of the (emerging themes) the local pharmaceutical 
market that have a bearing on the prices of generic drug is provided in this section.  
3.4.1. The Influence of Generic Entry on the Prices of an Off-Patent Innovator 
Product 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of generic entry on the price of 
an off-patent innovator product in the genericized (M = R19.77, SE = R3.34) and not 
genericized (M = R53.45, SE = R3.19) chemical entities. The difference of the effect of 
generic entry on the price of the off-patent innovator product between the two conditions 
was statistically significant at p < 0.05, [F(1,5594) = 53.02]. Post hoc comparisons using 
the Tukey HSD test indicated that the difference in the mean scores for the genericized 
and not genericized chemical entities were statistically significantly at p-value < 0.05.  
3.4.2. The Influence of Authorized Generics on the Prices of Generic Drugs 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of authorized generics on the 
price of generic drugs in the formulation markets with authorized generics (M = R2.66 and 
SE = R0.20) and in the formulation markets without authorized generics (M = R2.53 and 
SE = R0.06) conditions. The difference of the effect of authorized generics on the price 
of a generic drug between the two conditions was not statistically significant at p < 0.05, 
[F(1,4596) = 0.34]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the 
difference in the mean scores for the formulation markets with and without authorized 
generics was not statistically significantly at p-value < 0.05.  
3.4.3. The Influence of Authorized Generics on Price Erosion 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of authorized generics on price 
erosion in the formulation markets with authorized generics (M = 0.79 and SE = 0.01) and 
in the formulation markets without authorized generics (M = 0.55 and SE = 0.004) 
conditions of price erosion. The difference of the effect of authorized generics on price 
erosion between the two conditions was statistically significant at p < 0.05, [F(1,4402) = 
252.55]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the difference in 
the mean scores for the formulation markets with and without authorized generics was 
statistically significantly at p-value < 0.05.  
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3.4.4. The Influence of Close Substitutes (Me-Too Drugs) on the Price of Generic 
Drugs 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of me-too drugs on the price of 
generic drugs in the therapeutic markets with me-too drugs (M = R5.93 and SE = R0.44) 
and in the therapeutic markets without me-too drugs (M = R2.48 and SE = R0.06) 
conditions of the price of a generic. The difference of the effect of me-too drug on the 
price of a generic between the two conditions was statistically significant at p < 0.05, 
[F(1,4596) = 61.49]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the 
difference in the mean scores for the therapeutic markets with and without me-too drugs 
was statistically significantly at p-value < 0.05.  
3.4.5. The First-Mover Advantage and the Price of a Generic Drug 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of first-mover advantage in the 
formulation market on the price of a generic drug between the first-mover generics (M = 
R2.77 and SE = R0.10) and follow-on generics (M = R2.44 and SE = R0.07) conditions. 
The difference of the effect of first-mover advantage on the price of generics between the 
two conditions was statistically significant at p < 0.05, [F(1,4596) = 6.87]. Post hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the difference in the mean scores 
for the first-mover generics and the follow-on generics was statistically significantly at p-
value < 0.05.  
3.4.6. The Impact of Legislative Reforms on Pharmaceutical Sales 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of legislative reforms on the 
annual sales of generic products between the period before the reforms (M = R2.60M and 
SE = R0.19M) and the period after the reforms (M = R1.78M and SE = R0.07M) 
conditions. The difference of the effect of legislative reforms on the sales revenue of a 
generic product between the two conditions was statistically significant at p < 0.05, 
[F(1,4551) = 16.71]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the 
difference in the mean scores for the period before the reforms and after the reforms was 
statistically significantly at p-value < 0.05.  
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3.4.7. The Impact of Patent Expiry on the Prices of Innovator Products 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of loss of patent protection on 
the price of the innovator product in the before patent expiry (M = R49.22 and SE = R3.97) 
and the after-patent expiry (M = R31.23 and SE = R2.86) conditions. The difference of 
the effect of the loss of patent protection on the innovator product between the two 
conditions was statistically significant at p < 0.05, [F(1,5594) = 13.53]. Post hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the difference mean scores for the 
before and after patent expiry were statistically significantly at p-value < 0.05.  
 
3.5. Generic Fending Off Strategies 
Certain innovator companies tend to employ a wide range of strategies to maximize 
patent protection of their drugs with a view to maximize the commercial lifecycle.35 The 
study identified two generic fending off strategies that are employed by the innovator 
companies with a view to mitigate generic competition. Figure 3.5 presents a case study 
involving Loratadine in which both strategies were employed.  
 
 
Figure 3.5 Generic Fending Off Strategy - Case Study of Loratadine 
 
3.5.1. Introduction of Authorized Generics into a Formulation Market 
As seen in Table 3.2, the study identified 25 cases of authorized generics into formulation 
markets. The case study of Loratadine as depicted in Figure 3.5 demonstrates how the 
innovator company was able to keep this chemical entity viable despite the loss of patent 
protection.  
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Between 1999 and 2001 Loratadine was a viable chemical entity whose sales begun 
plummeting following the loss of its exclusivity in 2001. It is noteworthy that Loratadine 
traded under 5 different proprietary names during its on-patent and off-patent periods. 
The innovator product, Clarityne® was launched in Dec 1990 followed by Polaratyne ® 
10 months later, Oct 1991. Furthermore, Loratyne ® was introduced to the market in Jan 
1998 followed by Demazin Anti-Allergy in Apr 2001. All these products were launched by 
the same company, Schering-Plough which later merged with MSD.36  
3.5.2. Use of ‘Evergreening’ Tactics 
As seen in Figure 3.5, having come on stream in 2002, the sales of Desloratadine (an 
active metabolite of Loratadine marketed as Deselex®) rose sharply even exceeding the 
initial sales of Loratadine in 2009. Table 3.8 shows that the study identified 6 cases 
(including Loratadine) where modifications were effected on the prior art by filing for a 
new patent to secure exclusivity on the near expiry molecule. The most prominent form 
of line extension was the use of stereo selectivity where medicines that have a chiral 
center that comprise of a mixture of two enantiomers were used strategically.37 In this 
regard, a line extension is achieved by developing and marketing a pure form of one 
enantiomer, this phenomenon is also known as chiral switching.37 As shown in Table 3.8, 
the study identified the following cases of chiral switching: Nexiam® (Esomeprazole), 
Xyzal® (Levoceterizine), and Cipralex® (Escitalopram). 
 
Table 3.8 Generic Fending Off Strategies, 1999 – 2012  
 
 
 
As seen in Figure 3.5, the two-generic fending off strategies that were employed in terms 
of early generic entry as well as a line extension resulted in a significant preservation of 
revenue for the MSD without benefiting the patient. 
 
 
Trade 
Name
Generic 
Name
Dosage 
Form
Launch 
Date
Patent 
Expiry Date
Effective 
Patent Life 
(Yrs)
Trade 
Name
Generic 
Name
Dosage 
Form
Launch 
Date
Patent 
Expiry 
Date
Effective 
Patent Life 
(Yrs)
Stereoselectivity 20 Losec Omeprazole Tab & Inj Feb-90 Apr-99 9 Nexiam Esomeprazole Tab & Inj Apr-02 Jul-13 11
Stereoselectivity 7 Cipramil Citalopram Tab Sep-94 Jan-98 3 Cipralex Escitalopram Tab Jun-04 Apr-08 4
New Indication 27 Proscar Finasteride Tab Feb-93 Feb-05 12 Propecia Finasteride Tab May-99 Oct-14 15
Active Metabolite 14 Clarityne Loratadine Tab, Eff & Syr Dec-90 Jun-01 11 Deselex Desloratadine Tab, Syr, Srt May-02 Jun-05 3
Active Metabolite 25 Risperdal Risperidone Tab, Sol & Inj Nov-93 Mar-06 12 Invega Paliperidone Tab Feb-11 Jul-23 12
New Dosage Form 18 Efexor Venlafaxine Tab & Cap Feb-95 Dec-03 9 Efexor Venlafaxine Srt Feb-95 Dec-03 9
Generic Fending Off Strategy Additional Years Gained
Invention 1 (Prior Art) Invention 2 (Line Extension)
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3.6. Discussion 
The study found a reasonably high rate of annual patent expirations (M = 39.2 patents, 
SD = 4.7 patents). The period under which the study was conducted, 1999 to 2012, 
coincided with patent expirations of some of the leading best-selling drugs of all time. 
Forbes’ Pharma and Healthcare report lists Top 20 best-selling drugs of all time which 
included products such as: Lipitor® (Atorvastatin), Seroquel® (Quetapine), Seretide® 
(Fluticasone), Singulair® (Montelukast), Losec® (Omeprazole), Zyprexa® (Olanzapine), 
Diovan® (Valsartan) and Zocor (Simvastatin). Save for Seretide all the best-selling 
products attracted generic competition in South Africa.  
 
Except for Clexane® (Enoxaparin) which had an effective patent life of 19.6 years, the 
average effective patent life in South Africa is 9.24 years (SD = 3.95 years). This is 3.88 
years shorter than the USA.38 
 Grabowski et al. conducted a study that looked at 161 innovator molecules between 1994 
and 2011 that experienced patent challenges and considered the implications of such 
challenges on innovation and generic competition. They found that an average effective 
patent life in the USA was 13.12 years (SD = 3.48 years). Effective patent life is a period 
between product launch and patent expiration.39 Typically, a pharmaceutical innovator 
files a patent application as soon as they discover a chemical structure of the API.40 This 
is done with a view to mitigate the chances of competitors filing for a patent covering the 
same molecule. The differential in effective patent life between the USA and South Africa 
can be attributed to the registration backlogs at the Medicines Control Council (MCC). 
The reduced effective patent life from a South African point of view has revenue 
implications to innovator companies who seek to recoup their sunk costs related to 
research and development of bringing new therapies to the market.  
 
This study found the level of generic penetration in the South African market less than 
optimal on two levels. In terms of international standards, generic entry is considerably 
slow in South Africa. For instance, the sales of Zocor® (Simvastatin) continued to grow 
in the first two years following the loss of its patent protection. Hitchings et al. reports that 
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generic competition for Zocor® in the United Kingdom (UK)resulted in its sales collapsing 
from £250m to £2m in only two years.38 As shown in Table 3.3, the generic equivalent of 
Zocor® only entered the market in the second year following its loss of patent protection.  
 
Furthermore, Table 3.3 shows that the average rate of generic entry per chemical entity 
that lost its patent protection was 2.72 generics/chemical entity (SD = 2.14 
generics/chemical entity), 3.28 generics/chemical entity (SD = 2.73 generics/chemical 
entity), and 3.74 generics/chemical entity (SD = 3.23 generics/chemical entity) in the first, 
second and third years following the loss of exclusivity respectively. Kanavos conducted 
a research of 12 European Union (EU) member states that investigated the performance 
of the off-patent markets relative to their pharmaceutical laws with specific focus on 
generic drugs.41 At 1.0 generics/chemical entity, Greece had the lowest generic 
penetration rate in the first year following the loss of patent protection of an innovator 
product. South Africa’s generic entry rate per chemical entity was comparable to that of 
Austria at 2.8 generic drugs across all molecules.41 The best performing country was 
Germany that enrolled 10.8 generic drugs per chemical entity within the first year following 
loss of patent protection.41  
 
The average rate of generic entry rate per chemical entity within the first year following 
loss of patent protection was 3.55 across all the countries.41 The low generic penetration 
rate within the first year following the loss of patent protection in South Africa can also be 
attributed to the registration delays at the Medicines Control Council (MCC). A recent 
study that looked at registration timelines of the MCC found that it takes between 24 
months to 36 months to register a medicine in South Africa.42 The registration timelines 
by leading international regulatory authorities are 18 months and 12 months for the United 
States Food Drug Administration (US FDA) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) 
respectively.43  
 
The delays to market access by generic equivalents of chemical entities that have lost 
patent protection have an impact on access to medicines by patients.42 Additionally, the 
registration delays undermine the cost saving impact of generic drugs as an expenditure 
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optimization tool for health systems and patients alike.41 The rate of generic entry was at 
its slowest in the period 1999-2002. In 2003, the generic uptake increased by over 50.0% 
of the rate of entry of the previous year. The dramatic increase post 2002 can be attributed 
to legislative reform42 as it pertains to the introduction of section 22F and other pro generic 
legislative changes.  
 
The market performance of generics was found to depend on whether a drug was a first-
mover in its therapeutic class following the loss of exclusivity. For instance, Lipitor® 
(Atorvastatin) and Zocor® (Simvastatin) accounted for 42.0% and 32.0% of global sales 
for statins.44 In the case of the latter, Simvastatin, upon its loss of exclusivity in South 
Africa, Adcock Ingram was the first-mover to launch its generic version. The first mover 
status on Adcock’s generic equivalent secured it a 12th spot in the Top 20 ranked 
products. Save for Adco-Simvastatin, the remainder of the Top 20 ranked products by 
value in the in South African’ total pharmaceutical market were all innovator products for 
the period spanning 1999 to 2012. 
 
Secondly, less than half of the chemical entities that lost patent protection between 1999 
and 2012 lacked generic competition. A moderate correlation (r = 0.49, p < 0.01) was 
found between the market size of the innovator product prior to the loss of exclusivity and 
the subsequent extent of generic penetration. As demonstrated in Figure 3.2, the higher 
the sales of a chemical entity prior to loss of exclusivity the higher the average rate of 
generic entry. However, the study found that where the high sales of an innovator product 
were driven by a specialized technology in terms of a dosage form generic penetration 
was constrained. For instance, despite being the most successful product in terms of 
sales in the year preceding the expiry of its patent protection, Flixotide® (Fluticasone) did 
not experience generic competition since losing patent protection in 2001.  
 
The selective generic entry is indicative of the fact that the choice of products by generic 
companies is driven by commercial interests. This is consistent with the tenets of the 
theory of a firm as a profit maximizing entity.45 Craig contends that where the levels of 
differentiation are high, buyers’ power is weakened resulting in sub-optimal social welfare 
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in terms of affordability and access to care.34 This finding raises pertinent questions with 
considerable policy implications insofar as the NDP is concerned. As aforementioned, the 
goal of the NDP is to reduce the prices of medicines in South Africa with a view to improve 
access to medicines. The policy interventions have thus far borne fruit in certain respects, 
as demonstrated in Table 4.1 there was a statistically significant difference (p < 0.01) on 
price erosion in the periods before and after the institution of legislative reforms. However, 
it is evident that policy making ought to be agile and evolving to address the nuances of 
the market. 
 
Loss of patent protection on innovator products results in a removal of a significant barrier 
to market entry. In certain cases, this results in multiple generic equivalents, e.g. 
Loratadine (n = 20) and Simvastatin/Amlodipine (n = 16), of the innovator product entering 
the market to compete for market share.34 The aggregate impact of generic drugs in 
eroding the price of an innovator product is known as price erosion.19 Economic theory 
avers that product differentiation dampens price competition, however; where products 
are essentially the same, price competition can be intense.34  
 
It was found that the average price of generic drugs when there are 1 to 5 generic copies 
of the innovator drug competing was 57.0%. The price erosion dropped marginally when 
the number of generics is between 6 to 10. However, an entry of between 11 to 15 
generics resulted in an average price erosion of 56.0% of the innovator price. The 
aggregate impact of between 16 to 20 generics was found to result in an average price 
erosion of 39.0%. Caves et al., found that in the USA market the effect of generic 
competition is such that if the number of generic manufacturers increased from 1 to 10 
the average price of the generic drug drops significantly, from 60% to 34%.46 
 Furthermore, Caves et al. found that if the number of the manufacturers of generic drugs 
reaches 20, the average price of the generic drug is 20%.  
 
As shown in Table 3.2, the study identified 25 cases of authorized generics. The price 
erosion of the innovator products that had authorized generics was significantly lower (M 
= 79.2%, SD = 30.2%) than that of products that did not have authorized generics (M = 
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55.4%, SD = 25.6%); t(4401) = 15.91, p < 0.01. The authorized generics are common 
place in the pharmaceutical market,47 in 2014 the Innovative Pharmaceutical Association 
South Africa (IPASA) commissioned a cross-sectional study. The study sought to 
establish the status of outstanding regulatory submissions on 308 drug applications made 
by some of their member companies.48 The study found that the drug applications for 
‘clones’ were about a third (32.1%, n = 308) of all the applications of a segment of their 
member companies at the point of research.48 Elsewhere, Appelt conducted a research 
into the impact of authorized generics (pseudo generics) on price erosion of the innovator 
product and found that early entry is often done through a licensee or a subsidiary.47 
Appelt also found that the first-mover status confers a sustainable competitive advantage 
over follow on entrants. Fending off legitimate generic competition by insulating the 
innovator product from the dynamic forces of the generic market is driven by commercial 
interests. Since access to medicines is contingent upon affordability of medicines, this 
practice could potentially have dire health implications to patients whose access to care 
is compromised due to unaffordability.   
 
Table 3.4 shows the therapeutic rankings (at ATC 1) of products that are sold on the 
South African pharmaceutical market. Albeit minor differences between the generics and 
the innovators as shown in Table 3.4, the rankings of ATC1 categories are reflective of 
the current developments globally and in the country with respect to the use of anti-
infective agents. 
  
On the 21st of September 2016, a high-level meeting comprising of the heads of states 
and governments of various member countries of the United Nations (UN) met to discuss 
antimicrobial resistance.49 They acknowledged that the resistance of bacterial, viral and 
fungal microorganisms to antimicrobial agents that were previously effective in treating 
infections is because of inappropriate use of these agents. South Africa is evidently not 
an exception to this global concern as demonstrated by the fact that the general anti-
infectives for systemic use dominates (ATC J) the market share by value for the period 
spanning 1999 to 2012. The government has devised a three-pronged approach 
encompassing surveillance, infection prevention and control as well as antimicrobial 
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stewardship as part of its Antimicrobial Resistance National Strategy Framework 
Commitments. 50 
 
The rankings of the therapeutic categories and the products as shown in Table 3.7 are 
consistent with the report of the Medical Research Council (MRC) that South Africa is 
experiencing a quadruple burden of disease. The MRC avers that in addition to the 
epidemic of acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome (AIDS), high rates of trauma and other 
infectious diseases; the non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are on the rise in South 
Africa. Furthermore, the report lists the major NCDs in South Africa as comprising of 
cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, cancers, chronic respiratory diseases as well as 
mental health.51  
 
Table 3.7 shows that apart from the 4th ranked Coxflam® (Meloxicam) which accounted 
for 3.05% (n = R 8503.9M) of the generics’ market by value, all other products in the Top 
20 Products were treatments for the NCDs and infectious diseases. In the total 
pharmaceutical market as well as the innovators’ market the only exception to the top 20 
ranked pharmaceutical products was Clexane® (Enoxaparin) ranked 16th (1.31%, n = R 
36220.7M) and 17th (1.18%, n = R 44714.6M) for the innovators’ market and the total 
pharmaceutical market respectively by value.  
 
As demonstrated in Table 3.5, the dosage forms that present with little technological 
complexity (e.g. tablets, capsules, creams etc) in manufacturing were the most prominent 
in generic entry. This finding is consistent with Sinclair who argues that upon expiration 
of patent protection of the innovator product, the more technologically advanced 
formulations do not attract a lot of competition amongst the generic manufacturers as 
opposed to standard oral tablets.52 As discussed in Section 2.5.3, Aulton contends that 
inherent in the choice of the dosage form are the challenges that are associated with the 
technical aspects (skills, technology, capital etc) of manufacture. 52 
 
There are several important considerations that need to be made in designing a dosage 
form. Such considerations include biopharmaceutical properties (the rate and the extent 
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of drug absorption into the body), physicochemical properties (stability of the drug), and 
therapeutic properties (duration of action and dose frequency). As depicted in Table 3.5, 
the injections and infusions ranked 3rd and 4th in the generics sector of the market by 
value. This can be attributed to the fact that notwithstanding the onerous requirements of 
sterile dosage forms, registration of injections and infusions does not require the costly 
bioequivalence studies.53  
 
A dosage form is a key feature in demonstrating a bioequivalence of a generic drug to the 
innovator product. As such it stands to reason that the dosage forms that do not require 
bioequivalence tests or that are simple to demonstrate bioequivalence (e.g. immediate 
release tablets, capsules etc) will be attractive to generic drugs.54 The converse is true, 
the technologically advanced dosage forms (e.g. accuhalers, slow release tablets, 
transdermal patches etc) were found to be less attractive to generic manufacturers. 
Insufficient market entry by technologically advanced dosage forms keeps prices high.  
 
In cases where there was generic entry following the loss of patent protection on innovator 
products, several key dynamics that appear to have had a bearing in shaping the market 
emerged. As seen in Figure 3.4, there have been institutional forces at work accelerating 
the growth trajectory of the generic industry. It is evident that the rates of generic entry 
were spurred by legislative reforms related to 69(A), 22F, and Regulation 8 of the Patents 
Act, Medicines Act and Medical Schemes Act respectively. The growth of the generics’ 
sector is critical in terms of the impact as an expenditure optimization tool that results in 
cost savings for health systems and nations alike.  
 
This finding is consistent with the research study that was commissioned by the National 
Association of National Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (NAPM). The study found that in 
South Africa, the use of generic drugs as a percentage of the prescription market has 
been increasing significantly from 35.3% in 2002 to 53.5% in 2006.55 The growth of the 
generics’ sector is of critical importance as good health is essential for individuals to 
succeed as citizens, families, workers and consumers. 56 
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The results also suggest that there are innovator products that exit the market shortly 
following LOE. A common thread amongst the earlier exits were products that had low 
sales a year preceding loss of their patent protection, products that were in therapeutic 
classes that presented with intense competition (e.g. cardiovascular drugs) or small 
markets (e.g. antineoplastic drugs). As seen in Table 3.3, the study found a fair incidence 
of me-too drugs; M = 3 and SD = 3. Even though competition from ‘me-too’ drugs enhance 
buyers’ power it is duplicative research, the resources spent on research could have been 
spent on novel research. There are several neglected diseases such as malaria, 
tuberculosis, sleeping sickness amongst others that require resources to be directed at.57 
The Médecins Sans Frontières argues that “the human suffering caused by infectious 
diseases could be reduced; with billions of dollars dedicated to health R&D it should be 
possible to develop effective treatments for these diseases. However, the lack of R&D for 
diseases common in developing countries means that very few new drugs have been 
brought to market for them.” 57 
 
Other than the unwarranted suffering that many people in developing countries endure 
because of affliction by neglected diseases, the impact of ‘me-too’ drugs is wide ranging 
as it includes the use of scarce healthcare resources. Stephane argues that me-too drugs 
are generally launched 2.5 years after the breakthrough drug, with 20.0% more 
expenditure on marketing and often gains 38.0% of the market by year 4.31 A cross-
sectional study that was conducted by Innovators Pharmaceutical Association of South 
Africa (IPASA) identified 11.0% (n = 308) drug applications belonging to ‘me-too’ drugs 
at a single point of investigation in 2014.48 
 
 Patents are granted with a view to stimulate and recompense innovation, allocate 
resources efficiently, optimize consumer welfare, and ought to be granted in 
circumstances where true innovation can be demonstrated.39 As such, it can be argued 
that the presence of the me-too drugs in the market undermines the innovation into the 
real breakthrough drugs.  
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The registration of patents that present with minimal innovation as seen in Table 3.8 can 
be attributed to the depository system that is used in South Africa. This presents with 
flaws in that there is no rigorous scientific critique to establish whether a patent for a drug 
that is undergoing registration has the required attributes, viz; novelty, newness, 
obviousness and usefulness to trade or agriculture.58 This problem is compounded by the 
lack of the pre-and post-grant opposition procedures that are in place in other countries 
(Brazil, India and Egypt) of similar economies to South Africa. The Brazilian system is 
such that their medicines regulatory authority (equivalent of the MCC) is required to vet 
the granting of medicines’ patents prior to approval by the country’s patent office.58 This 
affords the patent registration office an opportunity to access the expertise that is not 
available internally about the novelty of the new therapy undergoing registration.  
 
Roox et al. identified several factors that lead to issuance of weak patents from a 
European perspective.59 Such factors consisted of, inter alia, lack of rigorous assessment 
of the patentability requirements such as the inventive step, examiners’ inability to check 
data presented to them, not enough consideration of third-party observations by 
examiners, and weaknesses in the opposition procedure. 59 
 
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa upheld an earlier court ruling in 
favour of Bayer Pharma AG which sought to prevent Pharma Dynamics from marketing 
a generic equivalent (Ruby®) of Yasmin® (Drospirenone 3mg and ethylestradiol 20 mcg). 
The court held that the marketing of Ruby® by Pharma Dynamics constituted an 
infringement of Bayer Pharma AG’s patent. Pharma Dynamics argued that the multiple 
patents that Bayer seeks to enforce lacked novelty and should not be regarded as an 
inventive step that qualifies for further protection from competition. Pharma Dynamics had 
earlier cited a court ruling by the European Patent Office in the case between Bayer 
Pharma AG vs Teva Pharmaceutical Industries where an application for revocation of an 
additional patent on Yasmin® was upheld. The Doctors Without Borders South Africa had 
run a campaign at the margins of this court case entitled “fix the patent laws!”, 
commenting on the outcome of the case, they pointed out that Ruby® was 30.0% cheaper 
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than the innovator product and that it would also give women more choices about their 
reproductive health. 68 
 
On the other hand, in 2013 the Supreme Court of India had rejected an application for an 
update of Norvatis’ antineoplastic drug, Glivec® (Imatinib). The court ruled that Glivec® 
did not pass the muster of invention and patentability to warrant a secondary patent. The 
patient groups pointed out that the cost of treatment with Glivec® amounted to $5,000 
monthly (in the US) whilst a generic equivalent of the same product was available at $200 
monthly in India.61  
 
The South African government argues that “a patent in the area of medicines is important 
since drugs are approved after clinical trials have been conclusive. Drugs, therefore, are 
based on a valid patent. It is contended that if “weak” patents are granted, it stifles the 
possibility of having access to public health. This means that if a patent is granted, even 
if there is no innovation on the original or dependent, access to public health may be 
difficult to attain.” The government is in the second round of consultations with a view to 
tighten the legislation that will stop evergreening as the practice is often called. 58 
 
As seen in Section 3.4.7, the South African pharmaceutical industry does not present with 
Generic Competition paradox in that the average unit price of the off-patent innovator 
product is less than the on-patent average unit price. The difference between the prices 
of innovator products before and after patent expiry is statistically significant. However, 
the results suggest that for the formulation markets that did not attract generic entry the 
prices are comparatively higher than in the corresponding markets where there is generic 
entry. This underscores the role of generic competition in applying downwards pressure 
on the prices of innovators’ products.21  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the presence of authorized generics does not have an 
influence on the price of a generic drug,62 the presence of authorized generics in the 
formulation markets presented with less price erosion in comparison to the markets that 
did not have authorized generics. This highlights the fact that authorized generics 
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cushions the innovator product from the effects of generic competition63 particularly 
because of the first-mover advantage that accrues on authorized generics. 47 
 
Therapeutic markets that presented with me-too drugs were found to have less profound 
impact on the average unit price of a generic drug than those that did not have me-too 
drugs in the therapeutic market. This can be attributed to the fact that where there is no 
therapeutic alternative, competition is not spread out over a few molecules, but it is 
focused on one chemical entity.64 Finally, the results found that the annual sales revenue 
of generic products had a statistically significant contraction in the period following the 
implementation of the legislative reforms. In the light of several pharmaceutical plant 
closures in South Africa as reported by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) it is 
not implausible that the effect of pricing reforms has had an adverse effect on local 
production pharmaceuticals as discussed in Section 6.2.  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
The levels of generic entry into the local pharmaceutical industry following the loss of 
patent protection are considerably low; where generic entry was lacking the prices of off-
patent innovator products were found to be considerably high in comparison to 
formulation markets with generic entry. Furthermore, generic competition in markets with 
me-too drugs was found to be less intense in comparison to markets without me-too 
drugs. Generic entry was found to be slow by international standards. The criteria for 
generic entry appeared to be driven primarily by the commercial viability of the chemical 
entity whilst under patent protection. Additionally, the formulations that present with 
complexity of manufacture were found to be less attractive to generic producers. The 
prices of generic drugs have come down significantly following the pricing legislative 
reforms. Price erosion was found to be inversely related to the number of generics in the 
formulation market. Formulation markets with authorized generics presented with a 
considerably low-price erosion.  
 
Notwithstanding the impact of legislative reforms on the sales revenue of pharmaceutical 
products, a paradigm shift is afoot in the local pharmaceutical industry with the generic 
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industry becoming more dominant. The prominence of generics in drug therapy is likely 
to optimize social welfare in line with the pharmaceutical policy of the South African 
government.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. THE IMPACT OF THE TRANSPARENT PRICING SYSTEM ON THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
Comparative analysis was drawn between the period foregoing the introduction of the 
transparent pricing system and the subsequent period by appraising several structural 
variables of the pharmaceutical industry in South Africa. The current chapter presents the 
results of this analytical comparison. Section 4.1 deals with the bivariate descriptive 
statistics between the study variables and the periods before and after the implementation 
of legislative reforms. To establish the statistical significance of the observations in the 
preceding section, inferential statistics are employed in Section 4.2. Finally, Section 4.3 
considers the overall impact of the pricing reforms with a view to establish if they resulted 
in a fundamental realignment of the market and possibly improved access to medicines. 
A discussion and concluding remarks are presented in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 respectively.   
 
4.1. Bivariate Descriptive Statistics of the Study Variables 
The period preceding the implementation of the transparent pricing system, 1989 (due to 
early entrants) to 2004, recorded an average of 4.86 generics (SE = 0.35 generics) per 
chemical entities that lost patent protection in comparison to an average of 3.88 generics 
(SE = 0.35 generics) per chemical entity that lost patent protection in the post 
implementation phase. There was a marginal decline (4.34%, n = R2.4M) in the sales of 
the innovator product in the year preceding the loss of patent protection following the 
implementation of the legislative reforms related to transparent pricing system. There was 
a low rate (4.92 months) of generic entry in the period preceding the implementation of 
the transparent pricing system in comparison to the 49.5 months following the 
implementation of the transparent pricing system.  
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Table 4.1 Bivariate Descriptive Statistics of the Study Variables 
Market Variables 
Implementation of the Transparent Pricing 
System 
Before After 
Mean SE Mean SE 
No. of Generic Manufacturers 
Per Chemical Entity 4.86 0.35 3.88 0.35 
Market Size of the Innovator 
Product Prior to LOE R2.4M R2.7M R2.3M R2.6M 
Rate of Generic Entry (Months) 4.92 3.06 49.6 1.47 
Price Erosion 0.67 0.01 0.56 0.00 
Average Unit Price of an 
Innovator Product R42.08 R3.61 R34.03 R3.03 
Average Unit Price of 
a Generic Drug R4.04 R0.18 R2.38 R0.06 
Average Entry Price 
of Other Generics R4.24 R5.47 R3.46 R4.48 
 
The price erosion exerted by generic drugs on the price of the innovator product was the 
greatest in the period following the legislative reforms, the price erosion was 0.67 and 
0.56 for the period before and after respectively. The average unit price of the innovator 
products and generic products declined by 23.7% and 69.7% respectively in the period 
following the introduction of the transparent pricing system.  
 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the average entry price of other generics in the same formulation 
market underwent a contraction following the implementation of the legislative reforms. 
As shown in Table 4.2 below, Schedule 5 care products were the least sold in the private 
sector whereas the Schedules 3 and 4 dominated the market. Generally, the use of over-
the-counter care products in either of the periods related to the implementation of the 
legislative reforms were found to be low. 
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Figure 4.1 Prices of Other Generic Drugs at Entry, 1999 - 2012. 
 
The of over-the-counter drug market comprising of Schedules 1 and 2 experienced the 
biggest negative differential, -2.95% and -6.63% respectively from the period preceding 
and following the implementation of the pricing reforms. On the other hand, Schedules 3 
and 5 posted the increases of 4.01% and 7.38% respectively from the period prior to the 
implementation of the legislative reforms to the period following the implementation. 
 
Table 4.2 Frequency Distribution of Schedules Before and After the SEP Regime 
Schedule 
Implementation of the SEP Legislation 
Pre-SEP Post-SEP 
Count Frequency Count Frequency 
S4 209 42.31% 1674 40.50% 
S3 186 37.65% 1722 41.66% 
S2 72 14.57% 328 7.94% 
S1 19 3.85% 37 0.90% 
S5 8 1.62% 372 9.00% 
 
Save for the alimentary canal (ATC1 A), central nervous system (ATC1 N) and the general 
anti-infectives that resulted in differentials of -9.35%, -15.3%, and 12.6%, respectively; 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Prices: Pre SEP 6.58 7.68 5.47 4.45 3.38 2.23 1.53 3.87 2.69 2.49 1.95
Prices: Post SEP 4.37 3.82 3.32 3.11 3.15 2.66 2.79 2.12 2.05 2.44 1.05 0.67 0.57 0.57 0.66 0.43 0.36 0.32 0.35 0.47
Prices: Pre-Post SEP 4.98 4.63 3.76 3.30 3.19 2.59 2.61 2.24 2.10 2.45 1.17 0.67 0.57 0.57 0.66 0.43 0.36 0.32 0.35 0.47
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the remainder of the therapeutic categories posted marginal changes in the period before 
and after the implementation of the transparent pricing system, Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Frequency Distribution of ATC1 Before and After the SEP Regime 
ATC 1 
Implementation of the SEP Legislation 
Pre-SEP Post-SEP 
Count Frequency Count Frequency 
A 10 2.02% 470 11.37% 
C 184 37.25% 1507 36.46% 
D 43 8.70% 93 2.25% 
R 72 14.57% 333 8.06% 
J 155 31.38% 776 18.78% 
L 4 0.81% 50 1.21% 
S 4 0.81% 8 0.19% 
M 14 2.83% 142 3.44% 
N 8 1.62% 700 16.94% 
G 0 - 34 0.82% 
B 0 - 20 0.48% 
 
As depicted in Table 4.4 below, there were no major changes in the frequency distribution 
of pharmaceutical dosage forms in the period before and after the implementation of the 
transparent pricing system. However, there were marked increases in two dosage forms; 
namely, the tablets and the syrups. The former increased by 6.28% from 71.1% to 77.3% 
in the period before and after the implementation of the transparent pricing system 
respectively. It is noteworthy that the capsules which were the 3rd leading pharmaceutical 
dosage form in the period before the implementation of the reforms increased by 5.54% 
in the intervening period.  On the other hand, the syrups posted the biggest decline of -
2.86% in the intervening period. 
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Table 4.4 Frequency Distributions of Dosage Forms Before and After the SEP Regime 
Dosage 
Form 
Implementation of the SEP Legislation 
Pre-SEP Post-SEP 
Count Frequency Count Frequency 
TAB 351 71.05% 3196 77.33% 
CRE 15 3.04% 23 0.56% 
LOT 7 1.42% 0 0.00% 
UNG 10 2.02% 4 0.10% 
SYR 19 3.85% 41 0.99% 
INJ 49 9.92% 325 7.86% 
OPD 4 0.81% 8 0.19% 
CAP 22 4.45% 413 9.99% 
GEO 4 0.81% 5 0.12% 
SHA 6 1.21% 16 0.39% 
SOL 4 0.81% 32 0.77% 
INF 2 0.40% 19 0.46% 
DRP 1 0.20% 4 0.10% 
SRT 0 0.00% 5 0.12% 
SRC 0 0.00% 16 0.39% 
SUS 0 0.00% 7 0.17% 
PTD 0 0.00% 3 0.07% 
ACC 0 0.00% 3 0.07% 
INH 0 0.00% 2 0.05% 
CHU 0 0.00% 10 0.24% 
GRA 0 0.00% 1 0.02% 
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4.2. Evaluation of the Impact of the Transparent Pricing System on Study 
Variables  
A combination of ANOVA tests (Table 4.1) and crosstabulation analyses (Table 4.5) were 
employed with a view to establish whether the introduction of the transparent pricing 
system had an impact on the realignment of the industry dynamics that have a bearing 
on affordability of medicines and access.   
4.2.1. ANOVA Between the Number of Generic Manufacturers in the Formulation 
Market and the Transparent Pricing System 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the transparent pricing 
system on the number of generic manufacturers in the formulation market in the before 
and after conditions related to the implementation of the SEP legislation. The difference 
of the effect of the implementation of the SEP legislation between the two conditions was 
statistically significant at p < 0.05, [F(1,219) = 3.95]. Post hoc comparisons using the 
Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean scores for the before and after related to the 
implementation of the SEP legislation were marginally significantly different at p-value = 
0.05.  
4.2.2. ANOVA Between the Sales of the Innovator Product Prior to LOE and 
Transparent Pricing System 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the transparent pricing 
system on the sales of the innovator product prior to LOE. The difference of the effect of 
the implementation of the SEP legislation between the two conditions was not statistically 
significant at p < 0.05, [F(1,544) = 0.09]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
indicated that the mean scores for the before and after conditions pertaining to the 
implementation of the pricing reforms were not significantly different (p-value = 0.76).  
4.2.3. ANOVA Between the Rate of Generic Entry and the Transparent Pricing 
System 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the transparent pricing 
system on the rate of generic entry in the before and after conditions related to the 
implementation of the SEP legislation. The difference of the effect of the implementation 
of the SEP legislation between the two conditions was statistically significant at p < 0.001, 
[F(1,968) = 173.0]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the 
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mean scores for the before and after conditions with regards to the implementation of the 
SEP legislation were significantly different (p-value <0.001).  
4.2.4. ANOVA Between Price Erosion and the Transparent Pricing System 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the transparent pricing 
system on price erosion in the before and after conditions related to the implementation 
of the SEP legislation. The difference of the effect of the implementation of the SEP 
legislation between the two conditions was statistically significant at p < 0.001, [F(1,4402) 
= 76.5]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean scores 
for the before and after conditions with regards to the implementation of the SEP 
legislation were significantly different (p-value <0.001).  
4.2.5. ANOVA between the Transparent Pricing System and the Average Unit 
Price of an Innovator Product  
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the transparent pricing 
system on the average price of the innovator product in the before and after conditions 
related to the implementation of the SEP legislation. The results suggest that the 
difference of the effect of the implementation of the SEP legislation between the two 
conditions is not statistically significant at p < 0.001, [F(1,5594) = 2.92]. Post hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean scores for the before and 
after conditions with regards to the implementation of the SEP legislation were 
significantly different (p-value = 0.08).  
4.2.6. ANOVA between the Transparent Pricing System and the Average Unit 
Price of a Generic Drug  
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the transparent pricing 
system on the average unit price of a generic drug in the before and after conditions 
related to the implementation of the SEP legislation. The difference of the effect of the 
implementation of the SEP legislation between the two conditions was statistically 
significant at p < 0.001, [F(1,4596) = 71.3]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD 
test indicated that the mean scores for the before and after conditions with regards to the 
implementation of the SEP legislation were significantly different (p-value <0.001).  
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4.2.7. ANOVA between the Transparent Pricing System and the Prices of Other 
Generic Drugs at Entry  
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the transparent pricing 
system on the prices of other generic drugs at entry in the before and after conditions 
related to the implementation of the SEP legislation. The difference of the effect of the 
implementation of the SEP legislation between the two conditions was statistically 
significant at p < 0.001, [F(1,4621) = 575.7]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD 
test indicated that the mean scores for the before and after implementation of the SEP 
legislation conditions were significantly different (p-value <0.001).  
4.2.8. Crosstabulation Analysis Between the Type of Drug Therapy and the 
Transparent Pricing System 
As shown in Table 4.5, crosstabulation analysis was carried out to establish the impact 
of the introduction of the transparent pricing system on the type of the drug therapy. The 
results of the Chi-square suggest that there is no statistically significant difference in the 
type of drug therapy between acute and chronic groupings, 2 = 5.83, df = 1 at p = 0.16.   
4.2.9. Crosstabulation Analysis Between the Type of Drug Market and 
Transparent Pricing System 
As shown in Table 4.5, crosstabulation analysis was carried out to establish the impact 
of the introduction of the transparent pricing system on the type of the drug market. Chi-
square results suggests that there is a statistically significant difference in the type of drug 
market between the over-the-counter and prescription groupings, 2 = 45.7, df = 1 at p < 
0.001. 
4.2.10. Crosstabulation Analysis Between the Complexity of Manufacture 
and the Transparent Pricing  
As shown in Table 4.5, crosstabulation analysis was carried out to establish the impact 
of the introduction of the transparent pricing system on the complexity of manufacture of 
a pharmaceutical dosage form. Chi-square results suggests that there is no statistically 
significant difference in the complexity of manufacture between not complex and the 
complex groupings, 2 = 1.89, df = 1 at p = 0.17.    
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Table 4.5 Crosstabulation Analyses of the Type of the Markets 
 
Implementation of the Transparent Pricing System 
Type of Drug Therapy Before After Total for the Row 
Acute 109 (22.1%) 729 (17.6%) 838 
Chronic 385 (77.9%) 3404 (82.4%) 3789 
All Groups 494 4133 4627 
Type of Drug Market  
Over-the-Counter  91 (18.4%) 365 (8.83%) 456 
Prescription 403 (81.6%) 3768 (91.2%) 4171 
All Groups 494 4133 4627 
Complexity  
of Manufacture   
Not Complex  439 (88.9%) 3752 (90.8%) 4191 
Complex 55 (11.1%) 381 (9.22%) 436 
All Groups 494 4133 4627 
 
4.3. Transparent Pricing System and the Realignment of the Local 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
4.3.1. Market Structure of the South African Pharmaceutical Industry 
Table 4.6 provides an appraisal of the outlook of the market structures in the periods 
before and after the implementation of legislative reforms (the introduction of SEP and 
pro-generic policies). The results suggest that the four leading pharmaceutical companies 
in terms of market shares, declined from 49.5% to 42.5% in the period following the 
implementation of the legislative reforms.  
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Table 4.6 Total Pharmaceutical Market Before and After Legislative Reforms 
Total Pharmaceutical Market 
Before Transparent Pricing System After Transparent Pricing System 
Rank Company Market Share Rank Company 
Market 
Share 
1 Sanofi-Aventis 16.7% 1 
Aspen 
Pharmacare 14.9% 
2 Aspen Pharmacare 14.2% 2 Sanofi-Aventis 14.8% 
3 MSD 10.1% 3 MSD 6.68% 
4 Pfizer Laboratories 8.48% 4 Cipla-Medro 6.18% 
5 Roche 7.60% 5 Astra-Zeneca 5.90% 
6 Bayer 6.48% 6 Bayer 4.66% 
7 Astra-Zeneca 4.78% 7 
Pfizer 
Laboratories 4.34% 
8 Novartis 4.57% 8 Adcock Ingram 4.00% 
9 Wyeth 4.23% 9 Novartis 3.80% 
10 Janssen Pharmaceutica 4.12% 10 
Janssen 
Pharmaceutica 3.78% 
11 Bristol-Myers Squibb 3.43% 11 Roche 3.28% 
12 Abbott 3.01% 12 Wyeth 2.86% 
13 Adcock Ingram 2.02% 13 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 2.60% 
14 Boehringer Ingel 1.86% 14 
Pharma 
Dynamics 2.44% 
15 AHN Pharma 1.79% 15 Sandoz 2.05% 
16 Nycomed 1.24% 16 Biogaran 1.90% 
17 Elli Lilly 0.90% 17 Nycomed 1.77% 
18 Servier Laboratories 0.75% 18 Abbott 1.64% 
19 Cipla-Medro 0.65% 19 Elli Lilly 1.39% 
20 Sandoz 0.59% 20 Astellas Pharma 1.33% 
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4.3.2. Market Concentration of the South African Pharmaceutical Industry   
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) was computed to elucidate the market 
concentration of the pharmaceutical industry in the periods before and after the 
implementation of the legislative reforms. The HHI for the period spanning 1999 to 2004 
presented with an HHI of 0.91 in comparison to the HHI of 0.72 for the period following 
the implementation of the legislative reforms.  
4.3.3. Market Segmentation of the South African Pharmaceutical Industry 
There is a considerable growth of the generics sector of the market as shown in Figure 
3.4. Insofar as the year-on-year growth for the generics sector is concerned, the year 
2004 represented the biggest growth (7.0%) since 1999 and has continued to grow at an 
average of 3.0% annually since then as opposed to a growth rate of 1.0% between 1999 
and 2003. 
 
The number of generic companies in the post implementation phase doubled in 
comparison to the period preceding the introduction of the policies. In addition to Aspen 
Pharmacare, Adcock Ingram and Cipla-Medro which were the only three generic 
companies in the Top 20 companies in the total pharmaceutical market for the period 
1999 to 2003, Sandoz, Biogran and Astellas made the Top 20 list of leading companies 
for the period 2004 to 2012. Save for Aspen Pharmacare, the rankings of Adcock Ingram 
(15) and Cipla-Medro (20) improved from their low positions in the period before the 
implementation of the legislative reforms to improved rankings following the 
implementation. Aspen Pharmacare retained its second position in the total 
pharmaceutical market followed by Cipla-Medro rising to position 6 in the post 
implementation phase. On the other hand, Adcock Ingram also improved its position to 9. 
 
4.4. Discussion  
In “perfect markets” willing buyers and sellers ought to be left to transact with each other 
without interference from the government as the markets have the capacity to effect an 
optimal allocation of resources.65 However, the WHO argues that the conditions for a 
perfect market are seldom fully met in pharmaceutical markets where market failure is 
often the norm warranting regulation. Accordingly, the South African government 
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intervened in the pharmaceutical industry with a view to optimise social welfare derived 
from medicines.  
 
Following the implementation of the transparent pricing system there were several 
changes in the performance of structural variables of the market. The contrast between 
the number of generic manufacturers per chemical entity that lost patent protection 
between the two periods (before and after implementation of the pricing reforms) was 
statistically significant. This can be attributed to the high incidence of patent expirations 
in the period preceding the implementation of the transparent pricing system. 
Furthermore, the intervening period was characterised by a marked increase in the 
abbreviated new drug applications (ANDA) following the implementation of the pro-
generic drug policies, Figure 3.1. There was a statistically significant difference between 
the rates of generic entry between the two periods, before and after the implementation 
of the transparent pricing system. This can be attributed to a high incidence of authorized 
generics in the period preceding the implementation of transparent pricing system as 
shown in Table 3.2.  
 
As seen in Figure 4.1, the increase in generic entry following the implementation of the 
pricing reforms resulted in price competition as each producer reduces their price with a 
view to protect and/or secure their market share.17 Such price competition exerts a 
downward pressure on the prices of drugs. As the number of generic products in the 
market increases the average unit price of generic drugs continue to decline.17 The 
aggregate impact of increased generic competition resulted in a statistically significant 
price erosion in the intervening period. Accordingly, the median entry price of the other 
drugs in the same formulation market presented with a statistically significant contraction 
of entry prices in the intervening period, Figure 4.1. 
 
In line with the price erosion, the decline of the average unit prices of generic drugs in the 
period following the implementation of the legislative reforms was statistically significant. 
This can be attributed to the intense competition in the generic market.66 By contrast, the 
period following the implementation of the pricing reforms resulted in a statistically 
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insignificant decline in the average unit prices of innovator products. The government 
instructed the pharmaceutical companies to recalibrate their prices in 2004 prior to the 
implementation of the SEP. This entailed the removal of the ‘fat’ related to perverse 
incentives (including bonusing and discounts) that were commonplace in the industry.9  
 
Since the prices of innovator products were higher than the generics, it follows that the 
percentage movement following the implementation of the new regulations did not have 
as much impact as the generics. This finding is consistent with the research conducted 
by Mediscor, one of the leading Medical Scheme Administrators in South Africa. In 2007, 
Mediscor reported that the overall medicine expenditure decreased by 9.7% between 
2004 and 2005. Mediscor attributes these developments mainly to the enactment of the 
pricing reforms, as the SEP for generic drugs decreased more than that of innovator 
products. 67 
The low frequency distribution of Schedule 5 products can be attributed to their high risk-
to-benefit ratio. There are strict controls in place and onerous recordkeeping related to 
the handling of products that belong to this schedule.68 The dominance of Schedules 3 
(mainly chronic medicines) is in line with the prevalent diseases patterns in South Africa 
particularly as it relates to NCDs.51 The foregoing discussion in Section 3.4 provided an 
explanation of high usage of Schedule 4 products (mainly anti-infective agents).  
 
The statistically significant decline in the frequency distributions of over-the-counter 
medications can be attributed to, inter alia, several products that were rescheduled from 
the non-prescription market to the prescription market in the intervening period with a 
view to avoid abuse in certain cases and due to risk in other cases.69 In the intervening 
period there was also a change in marketing practices resulting in the exclusion of 
Schedule 2 products from the category of the direct to consumer advertisement.70 Insofar 
as the Schedules 3 and 5 are concerned, the increased frequencies for the intervening 
period can be attributed to the institution of the prescribed minimum benefits (PMB). PMB 
is aimed at ensuring that the members of the medical aid schemes who present with 
certain chronic diseases can access their treatment by not having their funds run out.71 
Similarly, the increases in the frequencies related to the therapeutic categories of the 
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alimentary canal and the central nervous system can be attributed to, inter alia, the 
institution of the PMBs in the intervening period. Notwithstanding the introduction of the 
PMBs and the growing prevalence of NCDs in South Africa, there was no statistically 
significant difference, particularly with respect to chronic diseases, between the type of 
drug therapy before and after the implementation of the legislative reforms.  
 
Since tablets are the most frequently used form of pharmaceutical preparation by generic 
drugs, their increase in the intervening period can be viewed as a proxy for increased 
generic penetration in the same period. Notwithstanding the changes in the tablets, 
capsules and injections dosage forms there was no statistically significant difference 
between the complexity of manufacture before and after the implementation of the 
legislative reforms. 
 
The intervention of the South African government to regulate the price of pharmaceuticals 
is consistent with economic theory. Economic theory holds that where there is market 
failure it is the responsibility of a government to regulate the market to make for an 
efficient allocation of resources.65 South Africa has recently (2010) become a member of 
BRICS which constitute of Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa. BRICS is a 
conglomerate of emerging economies playing a prominent role in the world development 
platforms.72 In comparison to another BRICS counterpart, Brazil, South Africa made a 
significant progress in terms of generic penetration at the end of the 10-year anniversary 
since the enactment of pro-generic laws. In 2009 which marked the 10th anniversary since 
the enactment of the Generic Law (Law Decree 9787/99), the generics sector constituted 
a mere 14.0% and 18.0% market share by value and volume respectively. 73 
 
On the other hand, South Africa proved to be a lot more successful in terms of the levels 
of generic penetration. The country attained generic penetration rates comparable to 
global trends even before the 10th anniversary since the enactment of the pro-generic 
laws. Tellingly, the intervention of the South African government in terms of legislative 
reforms aimed at stimulating competition, directly and indirectly, has had a significant 
impact in making medicines affordable. The impact of the legislative reforms has been 
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two-fold, on the one hand it encouraged competition by making the market conditions 
conducive for generic entry. Secondly, the direct price controls have also borne fruit albeit 
somewhat with the average unit price of the innovator products. 
 
By contrast, the impact of the legislative reform was somewhat modest insofar as the 
market structure and market concentrations of the local pharmaceutical industry. 
Economic literature defines a market structure wherein the four leading firms control more 
than 40.0% of the market as an oligopoly.34 In an oligopoly, the market is characterized 
by a small number of large firms who are market leaders. This market displays significant 
interdependence amongst role players. Decisions and actions of any of the large firms 
can influence the market share and profitability of its competitors and as such there is 
always a need to consider the possible reactions of competitors in making decisions about 
marketing and pricing.34 From an enumerate definition of an oligopoly the results suggest 
that the legislative reforms effected changes to the market shares of the local industry. 
However, the movement of market shares of the four leading firms from 52.1% before the 
implementation of the transparent pricing system to 42.4% following the implementation 
of the reforms did not elicit a structural change in the market.   
  
Similarly, the assessment of the market concentration of the local pharmaceutical industry 
has revealed that the industry is highly concentrated. The HHI is a tool that is used to 
measure the level of market concentration in a given industry. The level of market 
concentration has a bearing on market competition and thus on prices. There are three 
interval boundaries for assessing the extent of market concentration in an industry. The 
interval boundaries are determined by the value of HHI. If the value of HHI is less than 
0.15 the market is classified as unconcentrated. If the value of HHI is in the range between 
0.15 – 0.25 the market is classified as moderately concentrated. Finally, if the value of 
the HHI is greater than 0.25 the market is classified as highly concentrated. The period 
preceding the implementation of the transparent pricing system presented with an HHI of 
0.91 in comparison to an HHI of 0.72 following the implementation of the reforms.  
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The legislative reforms effected a downward movement in the value of the HHI, however; 
the industry has not moved an interval boundary. It is noteworthy that the high HHI is not 
unique to the South African market al.one. In a study that was commissioned by the 
European Commission to look at the competitiveness of the EU’s pharmaceutical market, 
it was found that the HHI ranged from 0.92 to 1.22 amongst the EU’s member states.74 
Economic development of a nation is, in part, contingent upon the health of its citizenry; 
given the central role that pharmaceuticals play in healthcare, legislative reforms aimed 
at optimizing the social welfare of South Africans who consume pharmaceuticals was an 
imperative. Additionally, the reforms sought to comply with Section 27(2) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 as it relates to the State 
having to take progressive steps to ensure the achievement of the right to healthcare by 
the South Africans. Whereas there are evident gains, the structural arrangement of the 
industry has not undergone a fundamental change. The local industry remains highly 
concentrated and dominated by a handful of pharmaceutical companies which 
undermines competitiveness and social welfare.  
 
4.5. Conclusion  
The intervention by the South African government to effect pharmaceutical pricing 
regulation was consistent with economic theory as it pertains to intervening in markets 
where there is market failure. The legislative reforms resulted in both intended and 
unintended outcomes. With respect to the latter the intervening period presented with 
prolonged rates of generic entry because of increased applications emanating from a 
conducive environment for generics. 
 
On the positive note, the increase in the market share of generics in the market resulted 
in reduced prices of generic drugs in the intervening period. Additionally, the price erosion 
was at its greatest in the period following the introduction of the legislative reforms. South 
Africa was found to have fared better than one of its BRICS’ counterparts, Brazil, with 
respect to the responsiveness of the market to its policy interventions. Notwithstanding 
the positive attributes of the pricing legislative reforms, the market has not undergone a 
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structural shift and remains an oligopoly and highly concentrated; which are market 
conditions that are not optimal for a competitive industry.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. MODEL FOR THE PRICING OF GENERIC DRUGS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
This chapter comprises of four main sections. Section 5.1 presents the results of 
univariate descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables that are going to be used in 
the regression analysis of the price of a generic drug. This is followed by Section 5.2 
which provides an appraisal of the structural relationships (ANOVA and correlational 
analysis) between the price of a generic drug and the explanatory variables. Section 5.3 
presents a model for pricing generic drugs in South Africa, the first part of this section 
deals with univariate regression analysis followed by the multivariate regression analysis. 
The discussion and concluding remarks are presented in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 
respectively.  
 
5.1. Univariate Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
The market size of the innovator product in the year preceding the loss of patent 
protection was discussed under Section 3.2.2. As shown in Table 5.1, the results suggest 
that the price of the innovator product is higher than its corresponding price of a generic 
drug in the formulation market. Furthermore, the results suggest that the lagged entry 
prices of the earlier generics in the formulation market is higher than the average price of 
the new entrant. The average market share of a generic company is low suggestive of 
market dominance by a handful of generic companies.  
 
The dominant therapeutic category was found to be the cardiovascular system category, 
it accounted for just over a third of the market, Table 5.2. The average unit price of the 
cardiovascular system was the second lowest of all the therapeutic classes. The general 
anti-infectives were almost a fifth of the market by value and presented with an average 
unit price that is the third highest of all the therapeutic classes. The respiratory system 
was found to be the third leading therapeutic class with an average unit price being the 
lowest of all the therapeutic categories. 
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Table 5.1 Univariate Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables 
Variables Mean SD 
Sales of the Innovator Product in the Year Preceding 
its LOE: Formulation Level (Product Level)  
R4.01M 
(R39.6M) 
R5.79M 
(R48.3M) 
Price of the Off-Patent Innovator Product 
 at Corresponding Price Points with Generics R8.29 R37.04 
Average Price of a Generic Drug R2.54 R3.97 
Lagged Average Entry Price of Other Generics 
 in the Formulation Market R3.54 R1.77 
Average Market Share of a Generic Company 2.08% 3.29% 
 
The results suggest that the generic drugs that belong to Schedule 4 of the 
pharmaceutical market were cost drivers in the pharmaceutical market, Table 5.3.  
 
Table 5.2 Frequency Distribution of ATC1 Categories 
ATC1 Mean  SE Count Frequency 
L R14.96 R.47 52 1.13% 
S R11.25 R1.02 11 0.24% 
J R4.82 R0.11 907 19.7% 
A R3.84 R0.15 480 10.4% 
D R3.46 R0.29 134 2.91% 
G R2.70 R0.58 34 0.74% 
N R2.54 R0.13 708 15.4% 
B R1.82 R0.76 20 0.43% 
M R1.22 R0.27 156 3.39% 
C R0.97 R0.08 1691 36.8% 
R R0.91 R0.17 405 8.81% 
 
Noteworthy in this category are groups of drugs such as the statins, proton pump 
inhibitors, antineoplastic agents, antibiotics amongst others. This was followed by drugs 
that predominantly act on the central nervous system, Schedule 5. Finally, Schedule 2 
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which belongs to the over-the-counter drug market was to be the least costly category; 
products that belong to this category were the third leading category of most sold 
medicines in the market. 
Table 5.3 Frequency Distribution of Scheduling Statuses 
Schedule Mean SE Count Frequency 
S4 R4.38 R0.08 1855 40.34% 
S5 R2.65 R0.19 380 8.26% 
S1 R1.56 R0.49 56 1.22% 
S3 R1.11 R0.08 1907 41.47% 
S2 R0.90 R0.18 400 8.70% 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2.6, over 90.0% of the generics’ market is driven by three 
dosage forms, namely the tablets, capsules and injections. As shown in Table 5.4, the 
latter was the second highest cost driver in the market after the ophthalmic preparations. 
The solutions and shampoos were the least expensive pharmaceutical dosage forms 
respectively. The market size of the innovator product in the on-patent market was 
comprehensively dealt with under Section 3.2.2. Table 5.5 shows that the sales category 
R21.7M – R43.3 presented with the highest average unit price for medicines in the 
generics’ market. This category of the market was found to comprise of products such as 
the antineoplastic agents, inhalers and respiratory corticosteroids (accuhalers), blood and 
blood-forming organs etc.  
 
The second highest average unit price belonged to the R86.8M – R108.4M category. This 
category comprised primarily of agents that act on the respiratory tract and the general 
anti-infectives. The least expensive category in terms of the average unit price was the 
R65.1 – R86.7M category. This category comprised of the agents that act on the 
cardiovascular system, the alimentary tract and the respiratory tract. 
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Table 5.4 Frequency Distribution of Dosage Forms 
Dosage Form Mean SE Count Frequency 
OPD R11.25 R1.10 11 0.24% 
INJ R7.40 R.19 359 7.81% 
PTD R6.07 R2.10 3 0.07% 
SRT R5.21 R1.62 5 0.11% 
CAP R3.82 R.17 435 9.46% 
UNG R3.08 R1.01 13 0.28% 
LOT R2.94 R1.37 7 0.15% 
CHU R2.02 R1.15 10 0.22% 
TAB R1.97 R.06 3537 76.92% 
DRP R1.90 R1.62 5 0.11% 
SRC R1.83 R.91 16 0.35% 
CRE R1.65 R.60 37 0.80% 
ACC R1.55 R2.10 3 0.07% 
INH R0.58 R2.57 2 0.04% 
SUS R0.49 R1.37 7 0.15% 
INF R0.36 R.81 20 0.43% 
SYR R0.34 R.47 60 1.30% 
GRA R0.31 R3.63 1 0.02% 
GEO R0.30 R1.21 9 0.20% 
SOL R0.20 R.61 36 0.78% 
SHA R0.19 R.77 22 0.48% 
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Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics of the Sales of the Innovator Product Prior to LOE 
Sales of the Innovator 
Product Prior to LOE Mean SE Count Frequency 
R0.0M - R21.6M (1) R2.87 R0.11 1158 25.2% 
R21.7M - R43.3M (2) R4.15 R0.18 461 10.0% 
R43.4M - R65.0M (3) R2.54 R0.09 1936 42.1% 
R65.1M - R86.7M (4) R0.93 R0.15 663 14.4% 
R86.8M - R108.4M (5) R4.41 R0.50 60 1.30% 
R108.5M - R130.1M (6) R1.37 R3.88 1 0.02% 
R151.9M - R173.4M (7) R2.21 R0.62 39 0.85% 
R195.2M - R216.8 (8) R2.11 R0.23 280 6.09% 
 
The results suggest that the type of drug therapy that is least dominant in the generics’ 
sector of the market is acute care products, Table 5.6. This category of drug therapy was 
also found to present with the highest average unit price in the market. The chronic care 
products represented over three-quarters of the generics’ market. Furthermore, the 
results suggest that the type of drug market that dominates in the generics’ sector is 
prescription market, Table 5.6. The prescription drug market was also found to present 
with the highest average unit price in the market. Over-the-counter medicines represented 
only a tenth of the drug market. 
 
Table 5.6 Descriptive Statistics of the Types of Drug Therapy and Drug Market 
Market Variables Mean SE Count Frequency 
Type of Drug Therapy 
 
Acute (1) R5.97 R0.13 822 17.9% 
Chronic (2) R1.79 R0.06 3776 82.1% 
Type of Drug Market  
Over-the-Counter Market (1) R0.98 R0.18 456 9.92% 
Prescription Market (2) R2.72 R0.06 4142 90.1% 
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As shown in Table 5.7, the highest number of generics for a chemical entity in a 
formulation market was twenty. The results suggest that the average unit price of the 
generic drug is higher in the lower order of entry and the converse holds true. 
As depicted in Table 5.8, the period preceding the implementation of the legislative 
reforms (encompassing the transparent pricing system, the Bolar amendment and the 
mandatory generic substitution) presented with a higher average unit price for generic 
drugs.  
Table 5.7 Descriptive Statistics of Order of Generic Entry 
Market Variables Mean SE Count Frequency 
Order of Generic Entry     
1 (1) R3.19 R0.11 1205 26.2% 
2 (2) R3.32 R0.14 819 17.8% 
3 (3) R2.47 R0.16 599 13.0% 
4 (4) R2.33 R0.18 453 9.85% 
5 (5) R2.19 R0.21 358 7.79% 
6 (6) R1.92 R0.23 298 6.48% 
7 (7) R1.88 R0.25 239 5.20% 
8 (8) R2.04 R0.31 157 3.41% 
9 (9) R1.40 R0.32 150 3.26% 
10 (10) R1.49 R0.42 86 1.87% 
11 (11) R0.70 R0.49 63 1.37% 
12 (12) R0.74 R0.54 53 1.15% 
13 (13) R0.50 R0.56 49 1.07% 
14 (14) R0.51 R0.63 38 0.83% 
15 (15) R0.58 R1.13 12 0.26% 
16 (16) R0.40 R1.18 11 0.24% 
17 (17) R0.35 R2.26 3 0.07% 
18 (18) R0.32 R3.91 1 0.02% 
19 (19) R0.35 R3.91 1 0.02% 
20 (20) R0.45 R2.26 3 0.07% 
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Finally, the results suggest that the non-complex drug formulations dominate the 
formulation market, Table 5.8. The complex formulations presented with the highest 
average unit price in the market. 
 
Table 5.8 Descriptive Statistics - Pro-Generic Policies and Complexity of Manufacture 
Market Variables Mean SE Count Frequency 
Implementation of  
Pro-Generic Policies 
 
Before Implementation (1) R4.03 R0.30 173 3.76% 
After Implementation (2) R2.49 R0.06 4425 96.2% 
Complexity of Manufacture  
of a Pharmaceutical Dosage Form 
 
Not Complex Dosage Forms (1) R2.11 R0.06 4179 90.9% 
Complex Dosage Forms (2) R6.84 R0.18 419 9.11% 
 
5.2. Structural Relationship Between the Price of a Generic Drug and Market 
Variables  
Inferential statistical techniques comprising of an ANOVA and correlational analysis was 
employed to establish the relationship between the market variables that impacts on the 
price of a generic drug and how they influence the price.  
5.2.1. Price of a Generic Drug and the Number of Generic Manufacturers in the 
Formulation Market 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of categorised number of 
generics on the price of a generic drug. There was a significant effect of the categorised 
number of generic drugs on the price of a generic drug at p < 0.001 for the four conditions 
[F(1,3) = 99.2]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean 
score for the 1-5 condition was significantly different (p-value <0.001) to the 6-10 
condition, the 11-15 and the 16-20 conditions. However, the 11-15 condition did not differ 
significantly from the 16-20 condition.  
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5.2.2. Price of a Generic Drug and the Market Size of the Innovator Product  
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the categorized sales of 
innovator products in the year preceding the LOE on the price of a generic drug. There 
was a significant effect of the categorized sales on the price of a generic drug at p < 0.001 
for the eight conditions [F(71,4590) = 31.4].  
 
Post hoc analysis was also carried out for the conditions above. Six pairs of conditions 
were found to be statistically different at p < 0.001. Firstly, the differences between 
condition 1 (R0.0M - R21.6M), condition 2 (R21.7M - R43.3M) and condition 4 (R65.1M - 
R86.7M) were found to be statistically significant. Secondly, the following conditions 
presented with differences that were statistically significant: conditions 2, condition 3 
(R43.4M - R65.0M), condition 4 and condition 5 (R86.8M - R108.4M). Thirdly, statistically 
significant differences were detected in the following conditions: condition 3, condition 2, 
condition 4 and condition 5. 
 
Furthermore, statistically significant differences were found in the following conditions: 
condition 4, condition 1, condition 2, condition 5 and condition 8 (R195.2M - R216.8). 
Similarly, the following pairs of conditions also presented with differences that were 
statistically significant: condition 5, condition 3, condition 4 and condition 8. Finally, the 
following pairs of conditions presented with differences that were statistically significant: 
condition 8, condition 2, condition 4 and condition 5. 
5.2.3. Price of a Generic Drug and the Type of Drug Therapy 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the type of drug therapy on 
the price of a generic drug. There was a significant effect of the type of drug therapy on 
the price of a generic drug at p < 0.001 for the acute and chronic conditions [F(71,4596) 
= 891.7]. Post hoc test was conducted given the statistically significant outcome for the 
one-way ANOVA test. The differences between the acute condition and the chronic 
condition were found to be statistically significant at p < 0.001.   
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5.2.4. Price of a Generic Drug and the Order of Generic Entry  
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the order of generic entry into 
the formulation market on the price of a generic drug. There was a significant effect of the 
order of generic entry into the formulation market on the price of a generic drug at p < 
0.001 for the twenty conditions [F(19,4578) = 8.59]. Post hoc analysis was also carried 
out for the conditions above. Fourteen pairs of conditions were found to be statistically 
different at p < 0.001. Firstly, the differences between condition 1, 3–7 and 9-14 were 
found to be statistically significant. The following conditions presented with differences 
that were statistically significant: conditions 2 and conditions 3-14. Save for condition 8, 
conditions 3-14 presented with differences that were statistically significant with 
conditions 1 and 2. Condition 8 presented with a difference that was statistically significant 
with condition 2. Finally, no differences that were statistically significant (p < 0.005) were 
detected at condition 15 henceforth.    
5.2.5. Price of a Generic Drug and the Pricing Legislative Reforms 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the implementation of the 
pro-generic policies on the price of a generic drug. There was a significant effect of the 
implementation of the pro-generic policies on the price of a generic drug at p < 0.001 for 
the before implementation and the after implementation conditions [F(20,4577) = 45.7]. 
Post hoc test was conducted to establish whether the differences are statistically 
significant. The results suggest that the differences between the before implementation 
of the pro-generic policies and the after implementation of the pro-generic policies 
conditions are statistically significant at p < 0.001.   
5.2.6. Price of a Generic Drug and the Type of Drug Market 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the type of the drug market 
on the price of a generic drug. There was a significant effect of the type of the drug market 
on the price of a generic drug at p < 0.001 for the over-the-counter and the prescription 
conditions [F(1,4596) = 80.131]. Post hoc test was conducted given the statistically 
significant outcome for the one-way ANOVA test. The differences between the over the 
counter condition and the prescription condition were found to be statistically significant 
at p < 0.001. 
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5.2.7. Price of a Generic Drug and the Complexity of the Manufacturing Process 
Related to a Dosage Form 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the complexity of manufacture 
of the pharmaceutical dosage form on the price of a generic drug. There was a significant 
effect of the complexity of manufacture of the pharmaceutical dosage form on the price 
of a generic drug at p < 0.001 for the not complex and the complex conditions [F(1,4596) 
= 610.9]. Post hoc test was conducted to establish whether the differences are statistically 
significant. The results suggest that the differences between the not complex condition 
and the complex condition are statistically significant at p < 0.001.   
5.2.8. Correlation Analysis Between the Price of a Generic Drug and Study 
Variables   
Correlational analyses were employed to examine the relationship between the price of 
a generic drug and the sales of the innovator product before LOE, lagged number of 
generics in the same formulation market, price of the innovator product in the formulation 
market at corresponding price points, average market shares of the generic companies, 
lagged average price of the generic drug at entry and lagged price erosion.  
 
As shown in Table 5.9, the results suggest a none to extremely weak relationship between 
the price of a generic drug and the market size of the on-patent innovator product, 
average market shares of generic companies and the lagged price erosion. Furthermore, 
the results suggest a weak relationship between the price of a generic drug and lagged 
average price of other generic drugs at entry, and lagged number of generics in the 
formulation market. Finally, the results suggest a moderate relationship between the price 
of a generic drug and the price of the innovator product at corresponding price points as 
the generic drug in the formulation market. Save for the average market shares of generic 
companies which was correlated to the price at p = 0.02, the correlations of the foregoing 
variables and the price of a generic drug are all statistically significantly at p < 0.001  
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Table 5.9 Correlational Analyses Between Prices and Predictor Variables. 
Variables that are Correlated to Generic Price Pearson’s r p-value 
Sales of the Innovator Product in the Year 
Preceding Loss of Patent Protection -0.11 p < 0.001 
Lagged Number of Generics in the Formulation 
Market -0.24 p < 0.001 
Price of the Innovator Product at Corresponding 
Price Points 0.41 p < 0.001 
Average Market Shares of the Generic 
Companies 0.04 p < 0.05 
Lagged Average Entry Price of Other Generics 0.28 p < 0.001 
Lagged Price Erosion 0.07 p < 0.001 
 
Furthermore, the results suggest that both the market size of the on-patent innovator 
product and the lagged number of generics in the formulation market are negatively 
correlated to the price of a generic drug. 
 
5.3. Development of a Model for Pricing Generic Drugs in South Africa 
In addition to an account of the univariate descriptive statistics of the possible predictor 
variables that was presented in Section 5.1, their statistical significance as per Section 
5.2. The results of univariate regression are presented in this section, as shown in Table 
5.10. Univariate regression analysis was conducted to establish the possible influence of 
the variables that were identified as predictors of the price of a generic product. Tables 
5.10 and 5.11 presents the results of the analyses and the description of the acronyms of 
the variables respectively.  
5.3.1. Univariate Regression Analysis for the Type of Drug Therapy 
Regression analysis provides tools for building models that describe relationships 
between a dependent variable and one or more independent variable (s), all of which are 
numerical.80 The simplest type of regression model deals with one independent variable 
and one dependent variable.80  
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Given that when one plots two variables against each other in a scattergram, the values 
generally don’t fall exactly in a perfect straight line, linear regression analysis attempts to 
find the line that best estimates the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variable.80 A linear regression model that deals with more than one variable 
is known as a multiple linear regression.80 Multiple linear regression analysis quantifies 
the impact of various simultaneous influences (multiple independent variables) on a 
dependent variable.80  
 
Ү = 0 + 1X1 + 2X2 + …+ kXk + , where Ү represents the dependent variable, X1...Xk 
are the independent variables, 0 represents the intercept term, 1…k represents the 
regression coefficients for the independent variables, and  represents the error term, i.e. 
unpredictable random disturbance term.80 
 
Multiple linear regression analysis was used in this study to estimate the impact of the 
following independent variables on the dependent variable, as follows:  
  
The price equation (Explanations of terms is provided in Table 5.11) for the influence of 
the type of drug therapy on the price of a generic drug can be expressed as follows: 
 
GP = β0 + β1 TDT + ε           (1) 
 
As shown in Table 5.10, the results suggest that the price of a generic drug is inversely 
related to the type of drug therapy. The price of a generic drug will be -4.18 less if it is a 
chronic care product than it would if it were an acute care product.   
5.3.2. Univariate Regression Analysis for the Sales of the Innovator Product in the 
Year Preceding the LOE 
Equation 2 below provides a model specification for the influence of sales of the innovator 
product on the price of the generic drug.  
 
GP = β0 + β1SYPPE + ε          (2) 
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The results as depicted in Table 5.10 suggest that there is a positive relationship between 
the relative market size of the on-patent innovator product and the price of a generic drug 
following the loss of patent protection. The results of the correlational analysis as depicted 
in Table 5.6 bears repetition. A statistically significant negative correlation was found 
between the price of a generic drug and the sales of an on-patent innovator product in 
the year preceding its LOE. Furthermore, the univariate regression output between the 
price of a generic drug and the sales of an on-patent innovator product in the last year 
before LOE suggest a negative statistically significant relationship. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, the results suggest that a unit increase in the sales of the on-patent innovator 
product in the year preceding the loss of patent protection is associated with a negligible 
decrease (no change) in the price of the generic drug upon entry.  
5.3.3. Univariate Regression Analysis for the Order of Generic Entry into the 
Formulation Market 
Equation 3 below provides a model specification for the influence of the order of generic 
entry into the formulation market. The results suggest an inverse relationship between 
the price of a generic drug and the sequence of generic entry into the formulation market, 
Table 5.10. A unit increase in the positioning (sequence) of a generic drug in the 
formulation market results in a decrease of 0.22 in the price of a generic drug. 
 
GP = β0 + β1OGE + ε           (3) 
 
5.3.4. Univariate Regression Analysis of the Lagged Number of Generics in the 
Formulation Market 
Equation 4 below provides a model specification for the lagged number of generics in the 
formulation market and its influence on the price of a generic drug. The results suggest 
an inverse relationship between the price of a generic drug and the lagged number of 
generics in the formulation market. A unit increase in the number of generics in the 
formulation market results in a decrease of a price of a generic drug by 0.20.  
 
GP = β0 + β1LNUGEN + ε          (4) 
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5.3.5. Univariate Regression Analysis of the Lagged Average Price of Other 
Generics at Entry 
Equation 5 below provides a model specification for the influence of lagged average price 
of other generics at entry in the same formulation market. The results suggest a positive 
relationship between the price of a generic drug and the lagged average price of other 
generics at entry, Table 5.10. A unit increase in the lagged average price of other generic 
drugs at entry in the same formulation market results in an increase of 0.65 in the price 
of a generic drug. 
GP = β0 + β1LAEP + ε           (5) 
5.3.6. Univariate Regression Analysis of the Price of the Innovator Product in the 
Formulation Market 
Equation 6 below gives a model specification for the influence of the price of an innovator 
product at the corresponding price points with the generic product in the formulation 
market. The results suggest a positive relationship between the price of the generic drug 
and its corresponding price of an innovator product in the same formulation market, Table 
5.10. A unit increase in the price of the innovator product results in an increase of 0.05 in 
the price of a generic drug.  
 
 GP = β0 + β1IP + ε           (6) 
5.3.7. Univariate Regression Analysis of the Implementation of the Pro-Generic 
Policies 
Equation 7 below provides a model specification for the influence of the pro-generic 
policies on the price of a generic drug. As depicted in Table 5.10, the result suggests an 
inverse relationship between the price of the generic drug and the implementation of the 
pro-generic policies. Pricing in the period following the implementation of the pricing 
legislative reforms results in a price decrease of 1.55 in comparison with the period 
preceding the implementation of the reforms.  
GP = β0 + β1 IPGP + ε           (7) 
5.3.8. Univariate Regression Analysis for the Complexity of Manufacture 
Equation 8 below gives a model specification for the influence of the complexity of 
manufacture of a dosage form on the price of a generic drug. The results suggest a 
positive relationship between the price of the generic drug and the complexity of 
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manufacture of a dosage form, Table 5.10. The price of a generic drug will be 4.72 high 
if it is a complex formulation than it would if it were a non-complex formulation. 
GP = β0 + β1CMDF + ε           (8) 
 
Table 5.10 Results of Univariate Regression Results 
 b SE p-value 
Type of Drug Therapy -4.18 0.14 p < 0.001 
Sales of the Innovator Company 
Prior to LOE -0.00 0.00 p < 0.001 
Order of Generic Entry -0.22 0.02 p < 0.001 
Lagged Number of Generic Drugs in 
the Formulation Market -0.20 0.01 p < 0.001 
Price of the Innovator Product at 
Corresponding Price Points 0.05 0.00 p < 0.001 
Lagged Average Entry Price of 
Other Generics in the Formulation 
Market 0.65 0.03 p < 0.001 
Type of Drug Market 1.74 0.19 p < 0.001 
Impact of Pricing Reforms -1.55 0.31 p < 0.001 
Complexity of Manufacture of a 
Dosage Form 4.72 0.19 p < 0.001 
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Table 5.11 Description of Variables 
Variable Definition of Variable 
TDT 
Type of drug therapy in terms of acute or chronic as per the WHO’s 3-digit anatomical 
therapeutic chemical classification (ATC3). This is a binary variable taking a value of 
one if the drug therapy is chronic otherwise zero 
 
 
SYPPE 
Annual sales of the innovator product a year preceding the expiry of patent protection 
at formulation level. Used as a proxy of the market size of the product prior to loss of 
exclusivity. Sales are in real terms following deflation with consumer price index (CPI) 
using 1999 as the base year  
 
OGE 
Order of generic entry as a measure of a position of the new generic entrant in the 
formulation market of generic drugs  
LNUGEN Lagged Number of generic drugs at formulation level, n - 1 
IP 
Average unit price of the innovator product at the corresponding price point as the 
generic drug 
 
LAEP 
Lagged average entry price of generic drugs per unit of measure with respect to 
dosage forms. The price was lagged by 12 months. Prices are in real terms following 
deflation by CPI using 1999 as the base year  
 
IPGP 
Introduction of pro-generic policies encompassing the introduction of Section 22F and 
Section 69(A) of the Medicines Act and Patents Act respectively. This is a binary 
variable taking a value of one for the period following the introduction of the pro-
generic policies otherwise zero 
 
 
TDM 
Benefit-to-risk ratio as it relates to the requirements for a prescription in accordance 
with Section 22A of the Medicines Act. This is a binary variable taking a value of one 
if the product requires a prescription otherwise zero 
LPE 
Lagged price erosion represents the aggregate impact of the generic drugs in eroding 
the price of the innovator product. The price erosion was lagged by 12 months.  
 
CMDF 
Complexity of manufacture of a dosage form is a binary variable taking a value of one 
if the manufacture of a dosage form is complex otherwise zero.  
GP 
Generic price is an average unit price of a drug computed by dividing the average 
annual price of a drug by its pack size. 
β0 
represents the intercept term, 1…k represents the regression coefficients for 
the independent variables, and  
ε represents the error term 
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5.3.9. Multivariate Analysis of Generic Price and Predictor Variables 
The hypothesized price equation for the influence of structural relationships in the 
pharmaceutical market on the price of a generic drug is presented in Equation 9.   
 
GP = β0 + β1TDT + β2OGE + β3IPGP+ β4CMDF + β5LAEP + β6TDM + β7SYPPE + β8IP + ε  (9) 
As shown in Table 5.12, the results suggest that the type of drug therapy and the price of 
a generic drug are negatively correlated. If all variables are held constant, the chronic 
care products are 3.12 cheaper than the acute care products. Furthermore, the results 
suggest a negative correlation between the price of a generic drug and the order of 
generic entry into the formulation market. If all variables are held constant, a unit increase 
in the order of entry into the formulation market is associated with a decline of 0.06 in the 
price of a generic drug. The results also suggest that the sales of the innovator product 
in the year preceding the loss of patent protection are negatively correlated with the price 
of a generic drug. If all variables are held constant, a unit increase in the sales of the 
innovator product in the year preceding the loss of patent protection is associated with a 
negligible decline in the price of a generic drug upon generic entry. Finally, a negative 
correlation was detected between the price of a generic drug and the impact of the 
implementation of the pricing reforms. If all variables are held constant, the post 
implementation phase with regards to the pricing reforms is associated with a decline of 
1.28 in the price of a generic drug.  
 
On the other hand, the results suggest a positive correlation between the price of a 
generic drug and the complexity of manufacture of a formulation, the lagged average price 
of other generics at entry into the formulation market, the type of the drug market and the 
price of the innovator product at corresponding price points in the formulation market. 
Accordingly, if all variables are held constant, pricing in the formulation market suggests 
that a complex formulation will be 0.55 more expensive than the non-complex formulation, 
a unit increase in the lagged average price of other generic drugs at entry will result in an 
increase of 0.30 in the price of a generic drug; finally, pricing in the drug market suggests 
that a prescription product will be 1.16 more expensive than an over-the-counter product. 
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Table 5.12 Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Explanatory Variables b SE p-value 
Type of Drug Therapy -3.12 0.16 p < 0.001 
Order of Generic Entry -0.06 0.02 p < 0.001 
Price of the Innovator Product  
at Corresponding Price Points 0.04 0.00 p < 0.001 
Complexity of Manufacture  0.55 0.22 p < 0.05 
Lagged Average Entry Price of Generics  
in the Formulation Market 0.30 0.03 p < 0.001 
Type of Drug Market 1.16 0.17 p < 0.001 
On-Patent Sales of the Innovator  
in the Year Prior to LOE 0.00 0.00 p < 0.001 
Impact of Pricing Reforms -1.28 0.17 p < 0.001 
 
The adjusted R2 emanating from the regression results suggests that the model (equation 
9) accounts for 35.0% of the structural relationships that influenced the price of a generic 
drug in the market. 
 
5.4. Discussion 
As shown in Table 5.6, chronic care products command a higher market share in 
comparison to the acute care products. Magazzini et al. conducted a research study into 
dynamic competition in pharmaceuticals in 2004, they found that the products that treat 
chronic diseases are inclined to attract generic competition as opposed to acute care 
products. Cook devised a new product forecast algorithm which provides a pragmatic 
guide to how market dynamics are likely to shape the commercial success of a new 
product. The algorithm puts epidemiological data at the centre of the forecasting 
mechanism.28 Cook argues that chronic care products present with a high carryover rates 
than acute care products. Carryover rates are specific to the prevailing market conditions, 
therapeutic categories and reflect the customer’s loyalty to a product.28 As 
aforementioned, South Africa has a quadruple burden of disease carving out a market for 
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chronic care products.51 Insofar as the type of drug market is concerned, Cook also 
argues that the prevalence of chronic diseases in most societies is supportive of medicine 
launches in the prescription market of the pharmaceutical industry.51  
 
This proposition is consistent with the findings of the current research study which 
suggests that the chronic care products are priced cheaper than acute care products 
possibly due to intense competition in the former market. The level of generic penetration 
can serve as a proxy of demand within therapeutic categories. As such, generic 
penetration is likely to be intense within areas of therapy that presents with high demand 
for pharmaceuticals resulting in low prices due to competition.    
 
The results of this research study suggest that the generic manufacturers can carve out 
market niches particularly where they are well adept in the manufacture of technologically 
advanced dosage forms. The complexity of the manufacture of a dosage form was found 
to have a bearing on the probability of generic entry, number of possible generic entrants 
into the formulation market, and the price of a generic drug. These results are consistent 
with Tenn et al.33 and Sinclair. 52 
  
The results suggest that the market size of the innovator product prior to loss of patent 
protection explicitly influences generic entry and implicitly the price of a generic drug. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of Hudson. As aforementioned, see Section 1.1.2, 
in 2000, Hudson examined generic uptake in Japan, UK, Germany and the USA following 
the loss of patent protection and determined that the generic entry was driven by the 
market size of the innovator product before loss of patent protection. This finding was 
found to be in line with Magazzini et al. who also held that the commercial success 
(relative market size) of the innovator product facilitates generic entry.20 The results of 
the current study suggests an inverse relationship between the level of generic 
penetration as induced by the sales of the innovator brand prior to LOE. The findings of 
the current research study, Hudson and Magazzini et al. are consistent with the theory of 
a firm in neoclassical economics as it pertains to a firm as a profit maximizing entity.45 
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The commercial interests of generic firms guide the type of drug markets, drug therapy 
and chemical entities to market as opposed to epidemiological imperatives of the country.   
 
In 2016, during the state of the nation address, the South African president announced 
that plans to have a state owned pharmaceutical company were afoot.75 Ngozwana 
argues that a state owned pharmaceutical company can help solve the problem of 
medicine shortages in South Africa.76 The country’s leading labour movement (Congress 
of South African Trade Unions, Cosatu) has over the years advocated for a state owned 
pharmaceutical company. Cosatu argues that South Africa as a developmental state, 
needs to intervene decisively in key sectors of the economy that presents with problems 
or with a capacity to stimulate the growth of the economy.77 Potentially, a state owned 
pharmaceutical company could produce various formulations of essential medicines in 
South Africa indiscriminate of the market size of the innovator product prior to LOE and 
the complexity of manufacture. As shown in Table 3.1, only 47.5% of the innovator 
products that lost patent protection attracted generic entry. The results also suggest that 
where entry took place, the market size and complexity of manufacture were the key 
influential factors.  
 
The results suggest that legislative reforms had the intended impact in terms of exerting 
a downward pressure on the price of a generic drug. The introduction of pro-generic 
policies had an impact in terms of stimulating generic competition in the market. The 
foregoing illustration, Figure 3.4, provided an account of how the market segmentation of 
the local pharmaceutical industry underwent a paradigm shift from satisfying demand with 
innovators to generic drugs.  
 
The primary goal of generic drugs policies is to optimize the efficiency of drug 
expenditures by substituting expensive innovator products with affordable generics.78 The 
rationale is that bioequivalent generic drugs made in pharmaceutical plants that operate 
under cGMP present with the same safety and clinical profiles as the innovator products. 
This finding, impact of the implementation of pro-generic policies, is consistent with a 
study that sought to appraise the experiences of generics in multiple countries. de 
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Joncheere et al. reported that the use of generics is high in countries that implemented 
pro-generic policies. Specifically, de Joncheere et al. found that the Netherlands, Canada, 
Denmark’s use of the same policy options (generic substitution and reference pricing 
system) as the ones adopted by South Africa has had a positive impact in terms of 
stimulating generic competition.  
 
The results suggest a negative correlation between the order of generic entry and the 
price of a generic drug wherein the first mover advantage accrues for being the first to 
market. Generic entry is precarious and is not under the control of the entrant,78 not only 
is the date of regulatory approval by the MCC uncertain but each applicant does not know 
when and/or how many other generic applications have been filed on the same 
formulation. Section 34 of the Medicines Act forbids the medicines registration officers 
from disclosing any information to third parties that they gained in carrying out their duties. 
Whilst the resultant order of generic entry will be sequential, the entry decisions are likely 
to be simultaneous.78  
 
The firms that receive marketing authorization ahead of rival generic firms gets a first-
mover advantage. This allows the firm to sell their generic products sooner with minimal 
competition and often maintains the market leader position in terms of market shares in 
subsequent years. In their investigation of the generic drug industry dynamics, Reiffen et 
al. contends that a generic company that gets early approval is likely to have a sizable 
market share and good return on investment in comparison to the late entrants.78 This 
finding is consistent with the findings of Adriaen et al. who explored the pricing strategies 
of originator and generic medicines following patent expiry in Belgium. They found that 
the price differential between the generics in the formulation market and the 
corresponding innovator product grew larger with the increase in the number of entrants.22 
  
A positively correlated relationship between the price of the innovator product at 
corresponding price points with generics and the price of a generic drug suggest that the 
local off-patent market conforms to the Stackelberg leadership model.79 The innovator 
products are price leaders and the generic drugs are price takers. Empirical evidence 
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from the US suggests that in the pharmaceutical industry the originators and generic drug 
manufacturer’s use price differently, a situation known as, ‘Generic Competition 
Paradox’.80  
 
Generic Competition Paradox refers to a situation where generic entry has paradoxical 
effects on the prices of generic drugs and originator drug. The fact that ‘Generic 
Competition Paradox’ does not hold in South Africa can be attributed to the influence of 
market forces that are in operation in South Africa in comparison to the market of the 
United States of America (USA). The USA operates a free market system20 for the 
pharmaceutical industry as opposed to the heavily regulated market in RSA.  
 
South Africa spends 8.30% of its gross domestic products on healthcare, well above the 
5% that is recommended by the WHO.73 The NDoH reports that this 8.3% is split as 4.2% 
and 4.1% for the public sector and private sector respectively. The 4.1% spend in the 
private sector covers a mere 16.2% of the population who have private insurance.81 At a 
staggering expenditure of R 22.3 Billion (16.1%, n = R 138.6 Billion), medicines (and 
consumables) were the second highest benefit after private hospitals that was paid out 
by all medical aid schemes in RSA.82 It is therefore evident that the South African 
medicines’ market is lucrative. Evidently, the price of innovator products following loss of 
exclusivity is subject to the efficient allocation of resources as dictated by market forces 
and thus results in a downward trend in the light of generic competition. Conformance to 
the phenomenon of generic competition paradox would imply being left out of the 
medically insured in South Africa as they impose internal reference pricing systems.8 This 
is also in line with the finding that following patent expiry the price drop is significant, see 
Section 3.4.6.  
 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and medicines in South Africa are required to be 
registered with the MCC in terms of Section 22C(1b) and Section 15 of the Medicines Act 
respectively. If therapeutic equivalence is proven, in economic terms, generic products in 
the same formulation market are homogenous non-differentiated goods. Craig contends 
that where manufacturers of homogenous goods face flat marginal costs, the firms are 
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inclined to compete on price than on market share.34 The current research study 
undertook to investigate the determinants of generic price. The results suggest a 
statistically significant inversely proportional relationship between the number of 
companies, including the order of entry, and a generic price in the formulation market. In 
this sense, the higher the number of rival generic firms in the formulation market, the 
lower the price. As such the number of competitors acts as a proxy for generic price.  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
The price of a generic drug in South Africa was found to respond to the policy 
interventions in terms of regulating the market. Overall, seven market variables were 
found to have an influence on the price of the generic drug in South Africa. Five of the 
variables were negatively correlated to price with two variables been positively correlated. 
It is noteworthy that the off-patent market of the local industry conforms to the Stackelberg 
leadership model. This has far reaching implications in the light of the imminent price 
reforms related to international benchmarking as discussed in the following chapter.    
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. SOUTH AFRICAN INDUSTRIAL PHARMACEUTICAL POLICY: REVIEW AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Medicines are not ordinary articles of trade, they present with both positive and negative 
externalities; as such pharmaceutical markets are amongst the most regulated in the 
world.83 Policy makers must strike a balance between contrasting objectives whilst 
securing the health policy objectives.84 Health policy objectives such as protecting public 
health, safeguarding the patients’ human rights of access to safe and efficacious 
medicines, improving the quality of care and reigning in the pharmaceutical budget. 84 
 
This chapter seeks to provide an appraisal of the policy interventions in the local 
pharmaceutical industry and offer recommendations where the policy intervention 
presented with unintended consequences. The first section deals with the optimization of 
the rates of generic entry into the South African pharmaceutical industry in Section 6.1. 
This is followed by Section 6.2 which deals with the erosion of pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacity in South Africa. The challenges related to the current pricing 
regime are appraised in Section 6.3. Finally, Section 6.4 reviews a case that has been 
made about the negative impact of authorized generics on access to medicines which is 
followed by concluding remarks.  
 
6.1. Optimization of the Rates of Generic Entry into the South African 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
Notwithstanding the paradigm shift in the market segmentation of the South African 
pharmaceutical industry as pointed out in Figure 3.4, generic penetration rate was found 
to be a mere 47.0% of all chemical entities that lost patent protection. Furthermore, the 
study found that generic entry was selective particularly to innovator products that 
generated high revenues whilst under patent protection. Additionally, generic entry was 
also found to be discriminative based on dosage forms and therapeutic areas. In 2009, a 
Ministerial Task Team on Procurement identified, inter alia, extensive utilization of single-
source medicines and drugs for which there were no generics, high usage of costly drugs 
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particularly in oncology as some of the key challenges that had a bearing on access to 
medicines.85 
  
These findings are consistent with the results of this study with regards to selective and 
low levels of generic entry in South Africa. The WHO identifies two critical success factors 
for the successful implementation of an NDP. The critical factors are an installation of a 
monitoring and evaluation programme and a periodical review of the policy.86 Pharasi et 
al. argues that there has never been a comprehensive review of the policy 
responsiveness following the implementation of the NDP as there is lack of a 
comprehensive monitoring and evaluation programme (s).85 It has been 21 years since 
the adoption of the NDP but the sector presents with several key challenges related to its 
implementation.  
 
The low generic penetration rates are compounded by a considerably slow rate of generic 
entry into the South African market as pointed out in Section 3.2. It is well documented 
that the regulatory authority presents with considerable registration backlogs emanating 
from increased volumes of applications for registration.42 Leng et al. argues that the 
implementation of pro-generic policies opened the flood gates to numerous registration 
applications by generic companies.42 They also point out that a sizable number of the 
applications in the system relates to a practice of submitting multiple dossiers of the same 
drug by a single manufacturer resulting in the system being clogged up at the regulatory 
authority.42 
  
Evidently, robustness and agility need to be effected into the pharmaceutical policy. This 
can be achieved by first implementing a monitoring and evaluation programme that will 
identify the implementation challenges with a view to respond timeously before the 
unintended consequences manifests. The government should consider in its monitoring 
and evaluation programme the assessment of various aspects of generic entry such as 
therapeutic categories and dosage forms that are largely neglected with a view to 
incentivise the manufacturers to consider launching generics in such poorly penetrated 
127 
 
areas. As seen in Section 3.4.1, in instances where generic entry was lacking, innovator 
prices remained considerably high which could potentially affect access.   
 
6.2. Erosion of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Capacity: Tension between 
Public Health Policy and Industrial Policy 
As depicted in Table 1.1, at the dawn of democracy, the NDP outlined the health, 
economic and industrial objectives for the pharmaceutical sector in South Africa. The 
health goals pertained to ensuring the availability of drugs of good quality, safety and 
efficacy. The economic objectives sought to facilitate access to drugs by ensuring that 
the prices were affordable. On the other hand, the industrial goals of the NDP was to 
promote local production of pharmaceuticals and increase pharmaceutical exports. 
 
The Green Paper on National Health Insurance reports that South Africa has poor health 
outcomes despite spending 8.50% of its GDP on health. The WHO recommends 
countries to spend at least 5.00% of its GDP on health. Notwithstanding the poor 
prognosis on health outcomes, strides have been made in one of the key measures of 
health outcomes, life expectancy.88 Stats SA reports that life expectancy of South Africans 
increased from 52 years in 2005 to 61 years in 2014.89 This can be attributed to the 
massive roll-out programme of ARVs, South Africa bears the biggest disease burden of 
HIV/AIDS in the world.89 As such the South African ARVs tender is the biggest ever 
awarded by a single government.90 In the tender contracting period, 2010 – 2011, the 
South African negotiated a 53.0% overall reduction in the prices of ARVs.90 By 2015, 
42.2% (n = 6.4 million) of HIV-infected South Africans were on ARVs. The scale up of the 
ARVs treatment in South Africa resulted in the AIDS-related deaths falling from 51.0% to 
31.0% of the country’s overall mortality.90  
 
The reduction of the prices of ARVs in the public sector is an example of reduction of 
prices in line with the economic objectives of the NDP. This research study found that the 
legislative reforms that were enacted by the South African government yielded statistically 
significant price reductions. As seen in Chapter 4, the average unit price of medicines in 
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South Africa following the implementation of pricing reforms resulted in a marked 
decrease.  
 
A review of the policy responsiveness of the NDP would, albeit problems, suggest 
considerable policy success on multiple fronts (health and economic objectives). On the 
other hand, the industrial objectives of the NDP have largely failed. Despite the 
Department of Trade and Industry (dti) listing the pharmaceutical industry as one of the 
five prioritized sectors of the economy in its Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), the sector 
has major challenges. The pharmaceutical industry has experienced a significant erosion 
of its manufacturing capacity following a widespread closure of pharmaceutical plants in 
South Africa. According to the IPAP 2013/14 – 2015/16, 37 plants were closed in the last 
20 years or so.91  
 
The South African pharmaceutical market is the biggest in Africa (ahead of Nigeria, Egypt, 
and Kenya) and yet the pharmaceutical import penetration rate in South Africa is a 
staggering 65.0%. In 2015, the ratio of pharmaceutical imports (R 22.51 Bn) to 
pharmaceutical exports (R 5.02 Bn) stood at 4.48:1 resulting in a negative trade balance 
of R 17.49 Bn, the pharmaceutical industry is the fifth leading driver of the current account 
deficit in South Africa.92 Business Monitor International (BMI) forecasts an 8.60% 
Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) increase in pharmaceutical imports in South 
Africa, from R 20.63 Bn in 2014 to R 31.16 Bn by 2019. 
 
South Africa has recently adopted the Universal Test to Treat (UTT) programme which is 
advocated for by the WHO. UTT dictates that every individual who tests positive for HIV 
should be initiated on ARVs’ treatment right away irrespective of their CD4 count.93 The 
policy of the South African government had previously been to only initiate therapy when 
the CD4 count of the patient had reached 350. In 2010, the MRC reported that NCDs 
accounted for 39.0% of total deaths in the country; the deaths due to NCDs matched 
those as result of HIV/AIDS and TB combined. The MRC study attributed the rising 
incidence of NCDs to changes in lifestyle and urbanization.51  
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Despite a disproportionate burden of both infectious and chronic diseases and legislative 
regimes that spans the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) and the 
IPAP which both encourage local production, pharmaceutical manufacturing contributes 
a meagre 1.60% to the country’s GDP.94 The security of supply of medicines has been 
threatened on several occasions with medicines stock outs at healthcare facilities being 
commonplace. On the 5th of June 2015, the Minister of Health convened an urgent 
meeting with 32 executives of pharmaceutical companies with a view to respond to a 
national crisis related to medicines stock outs.95 The medicines stock outs affected 
several critical medicines such as drugs that act on the central nervous system, 
cardiovascular system, analgesics and anesthetic agents. Several reasons were 
advanced for the medicines stock outs and these included challenges with sourcing of 
the raw materials (active pharmaceutical ingredients and excipients), unexpected delays 
in the manufacture and packaging of medicines, and erratic medicines forecasts.95 Insofar 
as the former is concerned, South Africa imports more than 90.0% of its raw materials. 95 
 
The pursuit for low prices in the public and private sectors of the healthcare system in 
South Africa appears to have had unintended consequences with respect to local 
production of pharmaceuticals. As aforementioned pursuit of policies aimed at securing 
public health is often complex and at times might yield unintended consequences. The 
supply side health policy instruments to achieve equity and efficiency (i.e. optimal use of 
limited resources to maximize population health) appear to have undermined the 
industrial policy objectives. This problem poses a serious threat to the security of supply 
of medicines in South Africa particularly in the light of UTT which in itself represents an 
excellent window of opportunity to embed local production of pharmaceuticals.  
 
6.3. Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy in South Africa and the Computation of 
Single Exit Price Adjustments (SEPA) 
As outlined in the NDP, the appointment of a pricing committee, introduction of 
transparent pricing system, and regulation of price increases were amongst some of the 
key supply side policy instruments that the government sought to implement with a view 
to control the prices of medicines in South Africa. Following protracted litigation between 
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the pharmaceutical industry and the South African government these policy instruments 
formed part of the legislative reforms which were promulgated in 2004.97 
  
As discussed in Section 1.1.1, the amendment to the Medicines Act introduced Section 
22G which empowered the Minister of Health to establish a pricing committee and the 
transparent pricing regime. Ngozwana points out that amongst the various skills sets and 
stakeholders that comprise the pricing committee, there is no representative of the 
pharmaceutical industry in the committee.1 In April 2004, the government published a 
framework for the annual computation of the single exit price adjustments (SEPA), 
Regulations Relating to a Transparent Pricing System for Medicines and Scheduled 
Substances, Gazette No. 26304. Singularly, the South African governments’ policy of 
single exit price (health policy of the NDP) appears to present with a mirage of problems 
that has (d) a bearing on local production of pharmaceuticals (industrial policy of the 
NDP). Chief amongst the challenges of computing the ceiling price increase that 
pharmaceutical companies can implement annually is the apparent non-adherence to the 
prescribed methodology.  
 
The pricing regulations identified several economic indicators that ought to be considered 
in computing an annual SEPA. These included the following: “average CPI for the 
preceding year, the average producer price index (PPI) for the preceding year, changes 
in the rates of foreign exchange and purchasing power parity, comments received from 
interested persons and the need to ensure the availability, affordability and quality of 
medicines and scheduled substances in the Republic.” 9 
 
Representatives of pharmaceutical firms under the auspices of Pharmaceutical Task 
Group (PTG) have often decried the lack of transparency on the side of government in 
how it computes the SEPA.1 For instance, the use of the widely-accepted methodology 
to compute the SEPA does not provide the expected SEPA. Save for 2009 and 2011, the 
computation of SEPA by the PTG using the methodology has always resulted in a 
differential with the SEPA granted by the government.1 
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The PTG’s computations are based on the following formula:  
SEPA = 70.0% CPI + 15.0% (Rand/US Dollar Variance) + 15.0% (Rand/Euro Variance).  
 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers in South Africa operate under a harsh economic climate. 
Some of the direct costs such as utilities, labour and raw materials are worth appraising.1 
 Pharmaceutical manufacturing involves use of water that has undergone various levels 
of purification for it to become pharmaceutical grade. Furthermore, there are requirements 
for the treatment of air in the manufacturing environment with a view to avoid airborne 
contaminants. The heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) also make extensive 
use of electricity. The National Electricity Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) approved 
an annual price hike of 8.00% from 2013 to 2018. Eskom, the main supplier of electricity 
in South Africa, had requested the regulator (NERSA) for a 16.0% increase. It is worth 
noting that even the 8.00% increase that has been authorized by NERSA is well above 
the CPI. 97 
 
South African’ s labour force is not as competitive as that of peer countries.98 The World 
Economic Forum (WEF)’s Global Competitiveness Report of 2014/2015 ranks South 
Africa 136th (out of 144 countries) for income versus productivity. The WEF’s report also 
ranks South Africa 144th (out of 144 countries) in terms of industrial relations.99 
Pharmaceutical manufacturing is a knowledge based industry that requires an input of 
high end skills such as pharmacists, chemists, engineers amongst others. The country 
has an acute shortage of these skills which imposes high costs of recruitment and staff 
retention. 100 
 
South Africa imports more than 95.0% of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), and 
this reliance on imported raw materials leaves local manufacturers vulnerable to 
exchange rate fluctuations and vagaries.1 Deterioration of the local currency against 
major currencies, specifically the US dollar and the Euro, results in additional transaction 
costs for local companies leading to constraints in cash flows and profits. 1 
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On the other hand, the NDoH in its quest to achieve its health objective as stated in the 
NDP with respect to the quality, safety, and efficacy of the pharmaceuticals in South Africa 
sought accreditation of an international quality organization. Section 22C 1(b) of the 
Medicines Act empowers the government, through the Medicines Control Council (MCC), 
to prescribe the quality standard for manufacture of medicines in South Africa.27 
 
In 2007, the MCC in its endeavor to raise the quality standard of pharmaceutical 
manufacturing in South Africa, took up the membership of the Pharmaceutical Inspection 
Co-operation Scheme (PIC/S).101 PIC/S is a leading international organization that 
comprise of the members of the European Union (EU) and other developed countries. 
Members of PIC/S observe stringiest quality standards and GMP insofar as the 
manufacture of pharmaceuticals is concerned. South Africa is the only African country 
with this exclusive membership.101 
  
Attainment of PIC/S membership is a key milestone for the MCC with respect to its 
mandate of regulating medicines in South Africa and allows for cooperation with other 
peer countries that are members of the same scheme.101 However, the cost of compliance 
under PIC/S is onerous against the backdrop of reduced income because of the harsh 
economic climate that the local manufacturers operate under. It is probable that either 
directly or indirectly some of the legislative reforms related to pricing might be attributable 
to the erosion of manufacturing capacity in the country.  
 
The departure of the NDoH from the widely-accepted methodology (30/70, Forex/CPI) 
poses a lack of uncertainty to manufacturers as they cannot make accurate projections 
about their overheads versus potential income from their sales. Furthermore, other 
provisions that had been made by the pricing regulations at the time of publishing in April 
2004 has not been used. For instance, the regulations recommended that the SEPA 
should consider availability of medicines in the country as a guiding principle for the 
pricing committee.  
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Additionally, the regulations made a provision for the use of historic PPI data. Stats SA 
defines PPI as: “a measure of the change in the prices of goods either as they leave their 
place of production or as they enter the production process”102 
  
A formula that provides for changes in the historical PPI would probably account for the 
cost pressures that the local manufacturers of pharmaceuticals are faced with and would 
grant prices that allows a fair recovery of inputs costs. Whereas the use of CPI is aimed 
at protecting the consumers of pharmaceutical products, in the long run it has a negative 
impact if the security of supply of critical pharmaceuticals is at risk.  
 
Several studies have revealed that there is an inherent tension between health and trade 
(industrial) policies of many governments around the world.103 This experience of the 
South African pharmaceutical landscape holds true to this notion. In its publication that 
came out in 2015 entitled: “Trade and Health: Towards building a National Strategy”, the 
WHO provides several case studies of an inherent tension between the health and the 
trade (industrial) policies of governments around the world.103 The WHO recommends its 
member states to adopt an all-inclusive approach in the form of sector development 
strategies. Given its multi-disciplinary nature, a sector development strategy is likely to 
install adequate safeguards that avoids unintended consequences downstream.103 
  
The WHO was instrumental in helping the government of Ethiopia in its crafting of sector 
development strategy for the pharmaceutical industry. There are several pragmatic points 
that draws a sharp contrast with the South African situation that emanated from the 
Ethiopian strategy. For instance, the awarding of a state tender to a manufacturer is 
followed by a 50.0% upfront payment that allows manufacturers to make all the necessary 
working capital expenditures that would facilitate uninterrupted supply of pharmaceuticals 
to the state.104 In its report entitled: “Medicines Procurement Reform in the Public Sector”, 
the NDoH concedes that some of the medicines stock outs that are experienced in the 
country are related to the withholding of supplies by pharmaceutical companies because 
of non-payments by provinces. 105 
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Secondly, the tender cycles as per the Ethiopian sector development strategy are 5 yearly 
as opposed to the 2 yearly cycles in South Africa. A long tender cycle allows for stability 
as the manufacturer is able to effect efficiencies into their manufacturing environment and 
employ the staff that is required for the execution of the orders.104 This points to a need 
for prudency in policy making within the South African’ context.  
 
6.4. Authorized Generics and their Impact on Access to Medicines 
Authorized generics are increasingly forming a part of the innovator’s products lifecycle 
management strategies. The US FDA describes authorized generics as “[a]ny marketing 
by an [New Drug Application (NDA) holder or authorized by an NDA holder, including 
through a third-party distributor, of the drug product approved under the NDA in a manner 
equivalent to the marketing practices of holders of an approved [Abbreviated NDA 
(ANDA) for that drug”106  
 
Authorized generics are produced by, or under a licensing agreement with, the innovator 
company and are marketed by the same innovator company or through an affiliate, or 
alternatively, another third party such as a generic company. In this case, the generic 
company is required to split the sales revenue or pays royalties to the innovator 
company.106 In the USA, the marketing of authorized generics is usually linked to either 
the expiry of patent protection of the innovator product before there is generic competition. 
In other cases, the launch of an authorized generics is made to coincide with generic 
company’s 180-day exclusivity.107  
 
The legal framework in the USA allows for what is known as some Paragraph IV generic 
drug applications. Such drug applications are filed with the FDA under Section 21 of the 
U.S. Codes § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). This involves challenging an existing patent of the 
innovator product on the basis that it is invalid or that the marketing of its generic 
equivalent will amount to a non-infringement of the patent.107 
  
A successful challenge of the patent results in the awarding of what is known as a 
Paragraph IV certificate which under Section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) of the Federal Food, Drug 
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and Cosmetic Act establishes a 180-day exclusivity period.107 Under this code, the FDA 
is not allowed to approve other ANDAs for the same drug product. Notwithstanding the 
exclusivity for the first filer of an ANDA, the holder of the NDA, its distributors and 
licensees can continue marketing their products throughout the 180-day exclusivity 
period. In 2004, the US FDA invoked this clause in its response to an earlier citizens’ 
petitions by Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc (Mylan) and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc 
(Teva) that sought to challenge the marketing of authorized generics.107 
In its response, the US FDA held that “[t]the marketing of authorized generics during the 
180-days exclusivity period is a longstanding, pro-competitive practice, permissible under 
the [Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act)].107 
  
Dissatisfied with this viewpoint of the US FDA, the two companies approached the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia a month later.107 Both companies argued 
in court that the FDA’s response to their petitions was inconsistent with the fundamental 
premise of the Hatch-Waxman Act related to striking a balance between the competing 
interests of the innovator and generic companies.107 Effectively the two companies 
petitioned the court to rule against the marketing of the authorized generics prior to the 
expiration of the 180-day exclusivity period. The court affirmed the earlier decision of the 
US FDA and stated in its judgement that the FD&C Act “only prohibits the FDA from 
approving subsequent ANDAs until after the 180-day exclusivity period has expired. 
Nothing in the statute provides any support for the argument that FDA can prohibit any 
support for the argument that FDA can prohibit NDA holders from entering the market 
with a brand generic drug during the exclusivity period”. Teva took the case on appeal 
and lost the case.107 
  
Notwithstanding this legal precedent, in 2011 the Federal Trade Commission was 
sanctioned to examine the competitive effects of authorized generic drugs in the USA.107 
 Given that the authorized generics are marketed at price below the innovator products, 
the investigation held that authorized generics present with cost savings for the patients 
and the healthcare system in the short-term. However, the Federal Trade Commission 
found that the authorized generics reduce the profits of independent generic 
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manufacturers particularly because they act as de facto first-movers thus captures and 
retains a significant portion of the market share.107 
  
The Commission concluded that although the presence of authorized generics does not 
appear to have had a negative impact on patent challenges, this could possibly be due to 
the agreements between the innovator and generic companies.107 
 Such agreements could entail an innovator company agreeing not to launch an 
authorized generic in an exchange for delayed entry by the generic company. The 
Commission argued that the frequency and profitability of these practice is enticing 
enough to coerce independent generic manufacturers to settle. The effect of these 
settlements is a sub-optimal social welfare.107 
  
In Europe, the legal framework also facilitates for the entry of authorized generics in the 
member states of the European Union (EU). The European Commission, executive arm 
of the EU, issued a directive in 2001 (Directive 2001/83/EC) that sets forth a framework 
for authorized generics. Article 10c of this directive contends that a holder of marketing 
authorization may permit use of the pharmaceutical, pre-clinical and clinical 
documentation already filed during an NDA to subsequent applications relating to other 
medicinal products containing the same qualitative and quantitative composition in terms 
of the active substances and dosage forms.108 
  
In 2009 the Commission conducted a Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry with a view to 
establish whether authorized generics have negative aspects. Upon its conclusion, the 
Commission undertook to monitor patent settlements on an annual basis.108 Patent 
settlements agreements were defined by the EC as commercial agreements to settle 
patent-related disputes such as patent infringement or patent validity. The 7th Report on 
the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, (covering the period spanning 1 Jan 2015 to 31 Dec 
2015), by the EC sought to better understand the patent settlements between innovator 
and generic companies. The patent settlements were classified broadly on; firstly, 
whether the agreement anticipates a limitation on the generic company’s capability to 
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market its own product. Secondly, whether the agreement anticipates a value transfer 
from the innovator to the generic company.108 
  
The report found that the ability of a generic company to enter the market can be limited 
when the settlement agreement contains a clause that explicitly forbids the generic 
company from challenging the validity of the innovator’s patent (s); “non-challenge 
clause”. Furthermore, the ability of a generic company to enter the market can be 
constrained by a commercial agreement that includes a clause that explicitly forbids the 
generic company from entering the market until the patent (s) has (ve) expired; “non-
compete clause”.108 
  
The Commission affirmed the royalty free licenses that allow generic companies to carry 
out an immediate product launch without conditions related to quantities that can be sold, 
pricing of their products and the supplier of the active pharmaceutical agreements as in 
line with the applicable competition laws.108 However, the Commission held that licenses 
granted by the innovator company that facilitates market access for a generic company 
were limiting generic entry if such generic company is not allowed to enter the market 
with its own product or it cannot determine the conditions for the commercialization of its 
own product.108 This includes patent agreements in which the innovator and generic 
companies agree that the latter will be a distributor of the innovator product and in cases 
where the generic company is required to source its active pharmaceutical ingredients 
from the innovator company. Furthermore, the Commission views agreements that 
permits for early generic entry but where such entry cannot be immediate as limiting 
generic entry.108 
  
The Commission found that the value transfer from an innovator to the generic companies 
can assume various forms with a payment of a lump sum being the most clear-cut form 
of value transfer. Direct monetary transfer entailed buying an asset such as generic 
company’ stock of their own generic products.108 The terms of other patent settlements’ 
agreements that came before the Commission involved direct monetary transfer wherein 
the generic company explicitly or implicitly agrees to delay a launch of their generic drug 
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and/or agree to discontinue a patent challenge. The Commission held that innovator 
companies can afford such payments given that the settlements allows the company to 
continue benefiting from the sales of its well-selling product.108 
  
Other forms of value transfer involve distribution agreements in which an innovator 
company grants a commercial benefit to a generic company by allowing it to enter the 
market before patent expiry.108 Furthermore, other forms of value transfer involve an 
agreement wherein an innovator company binds itself not to exert its rights related to 
invoking a patent against a generic company. Technically, this constitute value transfer 
in that the generic company accrues marketable value because of the patent settlement 
agreement.108 
  
The Commission elected not to decide on whether the agreements that came before it 
during its investigation violated any competition laws of the EU. It held that a case-by-
case analysis of the agreements will be required to establish as to whether the early 
generic entry constituted an antitrust behavior.108 It further contended that there could be 
instances where early generic entry is pro-competitive when compared to the parties’ 
expected outcome of the litigation. On the other hand, the Commission held that it is 
possible that other generic entries (e.g. through license or a distribution agreement) could 
potentially undermine competition. The latter could involve agreements wherein the 
innovator company is fully aware that their product does not meet patentability criteria 
such that a patent challenge could render their patent protection null and void.108 
  
Finally, the Commission found that the number of patent agreements that are most likely 
to constitute an anticompetitive behavior declined from 22.0% to 10.0% for the periods 
spanning 2000 to 2008 and for the 2015’s investigation respectively. The Commission 
avers that patent settlement agreements that delay generic entry are to the detriment of 
the patients.108 
  
The incidence of authorized generics in Canada and Australia is 25.0% and 20.0% 
respectively.,109-110 In the case of the former, Canada, the courts ruled in 2004 in the case 
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between Apotex Inc. and Hoffman La-Roche Limited, that under the country’s’ 
competition laws the introduction of authorized generics does not constitute an anti-
competitive behavior. A similar ruling was made in the USA Despite the court’s ruling the 
use of authorized generics in Australia, as is the case in South Africa, is yet to be 
systematically investigated. 110 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4.1, the results of this study indicate that the presence of 
authorized generics in the formulation market does not influence the price of a generic 
drug. This finding is consistent with the study that was conducted by McGee looking at 
the economic and pricing impact of authorized generic medicines in South Africa. This 
study found that the pricing levels of multiple source under conditions of presence of 
authorized generics and absence of authorized generics in the formulation market were 
similar.62 However, as seen in Section 3.4.2 the results of the current study reveal that 
the presence of authorized generics does impact on the price erosion which raises 
questions related to access to medicines based on affordability. Following the approaches 
adopted by the USA and Europe with respect to instituting commissions to consider the 
influence of authorized generics on access, it is advisable for the South African 
Competition Commission to probe the matter and make findings. 
 
Cost containment is not a primary health policy objective but a tool that governments 
employ with a view to attain a balance between conflicting demands.84 Governments’ use 
of cost containment as a regulatory measure often targets the supply side of the 
pharmaceutical market, namely; the pharmaceutical industry with varying degrees of 
success.84 The WHO argues that most curative and preventive health actions depend on 
medicines and yet medicines involve powerful economic interests. Expenditure on 
medicines are often the second largest item after personnel’s wages and salaries.111 
Furthermore, the WHO avers that in most industrialized countries the cost of 
pharmaceuticals is rising by 8.00-12.0%, much faster than consumer prices. Lastly, the 
WHO contends that health systems must make essential medicines available and 
affordable to all patients.111 
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6.5. Conclusion 
Having identified the key features of the local pharmaceutical industry; the study 
developed a model that accounts for the characteristics of the drug, market, and the 
regulatory processes (legal framework) that influences the pricing of generic drugs in 
South Africa. The characteristics of a drug that has a bearing on the price of a generic 
drug were found to be the type of drug therapy, complexity of manufacture of a 
pharmaceutical dosage form, and the type of the drug market. On the other hand, the 
factors in the market that were found to influence the price of a generic drug were found 
to comprise of the order of generic entry into the formulation market, prices of the 
innovator product at corresponding price points with generics, market size of the on-
patent innovator product, lagged average price in the formulation market. Finally, the 
introduction of wide ranging legislative reforms was collectively found to have had an 
influence in the pricing of generic drugs in South Africa.  
 
The implementation of wide ranging policy interventions presented with both successes 
and challenges. Insofar as the successes are concerned, it is noteworthy that the prices 
of generic drugs came down significantly as a response to legislative reforms. The 
reduction of prices of medicines has a bearing on affordability and by extension on 
access. Extending access to medicines is central to the attainment of the aspirations of 
right to healthcare as enshrined in the constitution. Key to the reduction of prices of 
medicines in South Africa was the creation of a conducive environment for generic drugs 
by introducing pro-generic policies. On the other hand, the study found that patterns of 
generic entry remain unchecked and left to commercial interests of companies leaving 
certain sectors (e.g. dosage forms and therapeutic categories) of the pharmaceutical 
market uncompetitive.  
 
The erosion of pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity presents with a considerable risk 
to the security of supply of medicines in South Africa. Given the country’s high burden of 
disease, an interruption in the supply value chain could potentially have catastrophic 
results. It appears that the current pricing regime constraints the growth of local 
production of pharmaceuticals.  
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The results of this study are suggestive of a tension between the health and trade policies 
of the South African government. It will be prudent for the stakeholders in the 
pharmaceutical industry to adopt the sector development approach to plan and execute 
in tandem.  
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7. APPENDICES 
7.1. Appendix A 
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7.2. Appendix B 
Appendix B is provided on pages 144 to 147 below, it can be accessed electronically from 
the following link: 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/50ck87ma707flrh/AACvjiQZV8CeOMskGdJj1LcNa?dl=0  
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